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C.

Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code, plus Rule 3 and 4 Utah Court of
Appeals.

D.

Nature of Proceedings

This is an Appeal from an Order of the Circuit Court striking
defendant's Appeal as not being timely, which allowed defendants to
be evicted from their home since the Court further denied Defendant
the right to put up a Supersedeas Bond based upon the Court's
belief that it would not be overruled.

E.

I.

Statement of Issues on Appeal

In an action for restitution and possession of real

property, where no mention of Unlawful Detainer is acknowledged in
the Complaint or Summons and the Complaint reserves the right to
amend if plaintiff is damaged by defendants causing a potential
sale of the property to fall through, does the action fall under
the ten day limitation UCA 78-36-11, for appeal from an Unlawful
Detainer action or does the appeal period become thirty days, under
Rule 4, Utah R. App. P.
II*

If the action is found to be one of Unlawful Detainer,

where the Judgment was filed on September 10, 1990, and was mailed
by plaintiff to defendants on the same day; and on September 21,
-vi-

1990, a Bankruptcy with its Automatic Stay was filed by defendants
Gary and Peggy Salazar, which Automatic Stay was released by the
Bankruptcy Judge late in the afternoon on September 25, 1990 and
filed with the Circuit Court on September 26, 1990, does one add
the three days for mailing plus the four days during which the
Bankruptcy Automatically Stayed the tolling of the Appeal time
which would then make the Appeal filed on September 26, 1990
timely?
III.

Did the Court have the power to deny Appellants the

right of putting forth a Supersedeas Bond to Stay Execution on the
Judgment until the Appeal could be heard?

F.

Determinative Statutes

The statutes and rules which defendant Gary Salazar believes
may be determinative are copied or set forth in their entirety in
Appendix I hereto.

STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an Appeal from a Final Judgment or Decree of the
Circuit Court denying Appellant the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court for the State of Utah.

This was based upon the Court's

belief that this was a Statutory Unlawful Detainer Action and
therefore only ten days were allowable for the Appeal to be made
-vii-

instead of thirty days and that Appellants1 (defendants1) Appeal
therefore was not timely. R 9-10. In making its determination the
Circuit Court failed to take into consideration the Automatic Stay
of the Bankruptcy Court with added four additional days to the
Appeal Period-

E 16-17.

B.

Course of Proceedings

Ford Consumer Finance served Appellants

(defendants) Gary

Salazar, et al . , with a Notice of Trustee's Sale to be held on the
real property located at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Utah, on the
8 ' th day of May, 1990.

Appellant, Gary Salazar met with Gary

Powers, the agent of Ford Consumer Finance (Appellee), to pay a
part of the back payments.

These funds were accepted by Gary

Powers but after the time for the Trustee Sale was over, Powers
returned said funds to Salazar stating that the sale was complete.
Subsequently, a ten day notice to move was served by Ford on
the Salazars

followed by service of a three day Summons and

Complaint which demanded restitution, possession of the property,
and claimed Unlawful Detention.
The Salazars answered

Ford's Complaint, denying that the

Trustee's Sale was effective and claiming that the title for the
real property was still in the Salazars.
At the trial the Salazars (Appellants) complained that the
Circuit Court did not have the jurisdiction to make a determination
on who held the title to the property under UCA section 78-4-7(1).
The Circuit Court determined that it was not determining title to
-viii-

the property. R 9-11.
The Circuit Court, after the evidence on the title to the
property presented found that the Trusteefs Sale was valid and gave
restitution and possession of the property to Ford.

This Judgment

was signed on September 10, 1990 and was mailed to the Salazars on
that same day. R 3.
On the 21fst of October, 1990, Gary Salazar took out a Chapter
13 Bankruptcy whose Automatic Stay was set aside per an ex parte
motion of Appellee on the 25fth of September and filed on the 26Tth
of September with the Circuit Court.

R 16-17.

Whereupon the

Salazars immediately filed an appeal from the Circuit Court's
Judgment of September 10, 1990 on September 26, 1990, R 3., with
the Circuit Court and filed a Supersedeas Bond.

On a shortened

time schedule, agreed to by the attorneys, at the hearing on the
Supersedeas Bond, Appellee then proceeded to attack the timeliness
of the Appeal filing.

The Circuit Court

found, that the appeal

was not timely in an Unlawful Detainer Action even though Appellant
contended that this was not solely and Unlawful Detainer Action but
was partially an equity action due to the several causes of action
contained in the Complaint and therefore subject to a thirty day
appeal period. R 11-12.

C,

Disposition at Hearing

After the Oral Argument on October 1, 1990, the Court found
that the action was originally brought as an Unlawful Detainer
Action and that there were no issues of equity which would take the
-ix-

action outside of the Unlawful Detainer ten day Appeal Rule and
allow for the thirty day Appeal Rule.

In determining that Salazar

had not met the ten day schedule, the Court, allowed for three days
for mailing of the Notice and ten days for filing but did not allow
three days for mailing of the Notice of Appeal. R 10-12. Although
in later

discussions

the subject

of

the bankruptcy

and

the

withdrawal of the Automatic Stay being obtained by Appellee was
acknowledged by the Court, its extension of the ten day rule was
not discussed or argued but the Circuit Court ruled that it had no
authority to allow the Appeal and therefore Stayed the Appeal, the
Court also ruled that a Bond by Appellants would not be allowed to
retain them in their home pending the outcome of a potential
Appeal, but that Appellees would have to put up a Bond.

D.

Subsequent

to

R 10-16.

Bond Proceeding

the Court

dismissing

Salazars1

Appeal

as

untimely, this Appeal was brought by the Salazars, claiming:
1.

This action was not solely in unlawful detainer but in

equity and therefore had a thirty day appeal period.
2.

Even in an action in unlawful detainer, the time period

had not lapsed and therefore was timely because the Automatic Stay
of the Bankruptcy action, and the three day for receiving the mail.
R 16-17.
3.

The Circuit Court did not have the right to deny the

Supersedeas Bond which would then have left the Salazars in their
property until this Appeal could be heard.

R 19-20.

E.

Relevant Facts

The Salazars (Appellants) purchased the property in August of
1988.

Several times during their period of occupancy they fell

behind in their payments.

Each time Gary Salazar (Appellant) met

with Ford's (Appellee's) agent, Gary Powers had made substantial
payments whereby the account was reinstated.
On the day of the Trustee Sale prior to its execution,
Appellant met with Appellee and gave a substantial payment which he
understood would stop the Trustee Sale. After receiving the money,
Appellee (Powers) talked with Appellant (Salazar) for about an hour
after which Appellee gave the money back, and said its too late the
sale is now over.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute offers quick, harsh remedies.
Its use and applicability must be narrowly construed to specific
circumstances.
FIRST DEFENSE.

This action was not brought as an Unlawful

Detainer but as a hybrid or equity action.

this case was brought

as an action against Appellant Salazar to prove that title had been
transferred by a Trustee's Sale to Ford Consumer Finance (Appellee)
and if so have Appellants removed from the property.

Salazars

(Appellants) were in turn claiming that the sale was conducted
under fraudulent circumstances by the Appellee's agent and was
therefore invalid.
-1-

Appellee after making allegations of title possession left
open the possibility
suffered

by

in their complaint

Appellee

from

Appellants1

that damages might
refusal

to

leave

be
the

property, and therefore reserved in their Complaint the right to
ask for damages if they lost their Sale to a third party; thereby
making their action one in equity and subject to a thirty day
appeal period,
SECOND DEFENSE.

Even

if

the ten

day appeal

period

was

followed if credit were given for the three day mailing at front
and for the time that the Bankruptcy Stay was in force, then the
Appeal would have been timely.

Appellant filed its Appeal on the

same day the Stay Release was filed with the Court.
have

proceeded

any

sooner

without

being

in

It could not

contempt

of

the

Bankruptcy Court.
THIRD DEFENSE. The Court did not have the authority to reject
Appellants1 use of a Supersedeas Bond based upon the premises that
Appellees would ultimately win anyway.
the

execution

of

the

Judgment

This would have prevented

whereby

Appellants

could

have

remained in their home until the Appeal on the Denial of the Appeal
could have been heard.

ARGUMENT

1.

On or about the 28fth day of June 1990, Appellee filed a

Complaint with the Circuit Court alleging the following: (Appendix
I)
a.

That a Trustee Sale had taken place and that title to

the property was now in Appellee's name.

(Appendix I, paragraphs

3, 4)

b.

That because of the Trustee Sale and the transfer of

ownership that Appellants were now tenants at will.

(Appendix I.,

paragraph 5)
c.

That

the Appellants had refused

to vacate the

premises, even though given a ten day Notice to Quit Premises had
been served upon them.

(Appendix I, paragraphs 6, 7)

d. That the Appellants still retained possession of said
premises

and

were

in

"Unlawful

reasonable rental was $35.00.
e.

Detention

thereof", and

the

(Appendix I, paragraph 8)

That Appellee had a prospective buyer

for the

premises and Appellants had interfered with the potential sale.
(Appendix I, paragraphs 10f 11)
f.

That if the sale fell through due to the actions of

Appellants which resulted in a loss to Appellee's; Appellees would
be able to amend the Complaint to reflect the loss.

(Appendix I,

paragraph 12)
2.

In Appellee's prayer for the Judgment and Relief he

requests the following:

(Appendix I, paragraphs a, b, c & d of

prayer)
a.

An order granting restitution and possession of the

premises and Court costs.
b.

Judgment for thirty-eight days for $1330.00 and

$105.00 per day from the date of service of the Notice to Quit
until Appellee actually takes possession "and for such other and
further relief as to the Court seems proper".
3.

At no time does Appellee make mention of the unlawful
-3-

detainer statute or that he is bringing his action pursuant to
Section 78-36-1 to 78-36-12 UCA.

The only mention that even

closely relates to Unlawful Detainer is a mention that Appellant
was "in unlawful detention thereof". An Unlawful Detention Action
according to section 76-5-304 is from the criminal code and is a
"(1) A.

Person commits

Unlawful

Detention

if he

knowingly

restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with
his liberty. (2) Unlawful Detention is a Class B misdemeanor".
4. Furthermore under paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of Appellee's
Complaint, the process was set up for proving further damages if
necessary against Appellants, if a potential sale should fall
through causing a loss to the Appellee.
5. While it is true that Appellee requested triple the daily
rent for each day the Appellants stayed after the Notice to Quit
had been served, no mention is made as to upon what basis the
triple rent is allowable.

Therefore nowhere is unlawful detainer

mentioned only restitution and possession of the premise, unlawful
detention and a desire for equity relief if damages from the non
sale of the property is suffered.
6.

Under a recent Utah case, Fashions Four Corporation vs.

Fashion Place Associates 681 P. 2d 830, the Supreme Court found
that "we are compelled to conclude that the hybrid nature of
plaintiff's action, containing additional declaratory and equitable
clauses, and from the defendants' counterclaim with the similar
clauses, prevents section 78-36-11 from controlling the time for
appeal".

Under an older case, Ottenheimer, et al. vs. Mt. States

Supply Co. 56 Utah 190, where the court finds "While it is true
-4-

that the relief prayed for in the first cause of action might have
been had in a proceeding of forcible detainer, yet it is also true
that the relief sought and obtained by plaintiff under the second
cause of action is purely eguitable, and could not have been had in
a forcible detainer action under our statute.
was tried throughout

and submitted

Moreover, the case

to the Court, and by it

determined, as an action in eguity."
7.

What were the requested actions demanded by the Appellee

in his Complaint?
a. He requested the Court give him restitution and possession
of his property-

Restitution being an action in equity according

to Blacks Law Dictionary, "restitution is the act of restoring;
restoration; restoration of anything to its rightful owner; the act
of making good or giving eguivalent
injury;".

for any loss, damage, or

Under the Common Law a Writ of Restitution was act in

equity, "Restoration of both parties to their original condition".
The Appellees did not designate that this was an action in
Unlawful Detainer.

In order to make an issue clear especially

where rights are clearly effected, i.e., ten day appeal period for
Unlawful Detainer vs. a thirty day appeal period for all other
actions, it is necessary for the Complaint to clearly designate
which theory a plaintiff brings in action.
b. The second action in equity requested was the alleging the
potential damages if a sell were lost by the Appellees, and the
reserving of a right to amend the complaint to reflect that loss if
it transpired. Even if the Court were to find that the restitution
and possession of the property was not an equitable action, then

and possession of the property was not an equitable action, then
requesting potential relief from the loss of the sale brings it
back to a hybrid action of both unlawful detainer and equity which
according

to

Fashions

Four

Corporation

vs.

Fashion

Place

Associates, takes it outside of the ten day Appeal period and makes
it a thirty day Appeal period.
8.

What did the Judgment entered by the Court designate the

action under consideration?
The title to the Judgment signed by the Court was "JUDGMENT,
JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION OF PREMISES AND DECLARING FORFEITURE OF
TENANCY".

(Appendix IV) Nothing in the title designates that this

was an action brought under the Unlawful Detainer Statute, although
as a part of the Judgments, Appellees are given triple damages,
based upon the normal rent to be charged, and triple damages are
adjudged to be given, until the Appellants leave the premises plus
that the Appellants "are guilty of unlawful detainer", that "a writ
of restitution issue"; and "that any interest of" Appellants "to
lease or tenant said premises" "is forfeited and terminated".

Some

are items incumbent in statutory unlawful detainer but can be parts
of an action in equity.

Certainly

if this were an action in

unlawful detainer under Utah's Act, a designation of qualification
would be appropriate.

At least all parties would know what the

action really was.
9.

What did the Findings of fact show the action to be?

Appendix III)
Under the Finding of Fact the Court made a number of findings
relative to who held title to the property.

-6-

It also found that

regarding the Appellants and the premises but made no reference to
whether or not this action was brought as an unlawful detainer
action. It goes on further to mention that Appellants had claimed
fraud relative to Appellee's agents relation to the Trustee's Sell
and found no fraud and then states, "That defendants claims in
equity regarding the fairness of plaintiff's (Appellant's) actions
were not sufficiently proven to justify the Court's disallowance of
the Trustee's Deed, although plaintiff through its attorney, did
stipulate at the start of trial that the Court could so hold and
rule, if the evidence so warranted", (Appendix iii, paragraph 8)
clearly showing that equity was a part of the action either by the
complaint and the answer thereto or by appellees stipulation in
open court that the equity issues could be heard.

It is also

evident that the Court had no authority in an action to determine
title under

section

78-4-7(1) UCA, and

is beyond

its civil

jurisdiction in both law and equity.
10.

What did the Conclusions of Law find the action to be?

The Court found that Appellees were owners of the land showing
that determination as to who had title, had been made.

It also

found that the Appellants had been tenants at will and Appellees
had followed statutory requirements to evict Appellants from the
premises but did not state which statutory requirements- still
leaving undetermined
Unlawful

whether

Detainer, or

this was an action

Equity,

or

both.

It

in Statutory

found

that

the

Appellants are in Unlawful Detention of the premises, (which is a
criminal action) that the Appellee was entitled to a writ of
restitution removing Appellants and their belongings from the

-7-

restitution

removing Appellants

and

their

belongings

from

the

premises, and that damages including those for triple damages were
proper.

Still at no time

is the Statutory

Unlawful

Retainer

referred to nor even a guilt of Unlawful Detainer but only a guilt
of Unlawful Detention, (a criminal act).
11.

Therefore, under none of the Court filings, (Complaint,

Findings of Fact, or Conclusions of Law) are the Appellants found
guilty of statutory Unlawful Detainer, but only unlawful detention.
While it is true that unlawful detainer is mention in the judgment,
no reference of statutory unlawful detainer is mentioned.
12.

Wherefore, this action was not brought

as

statutory

unlawful detainer action but as one for restitution and possession
of the premises under an equity theory.

If the court finds that

this was a statutory unlawful detainer action under UCA section 7836-11, time for appeal then, the equity portions of the Complaint
would take it outside of the ten day rule under Fashions Four vs.
Fashion Place A s s o c , 681 P.2d 8 30 (Utah 1984), etc.
13.

Supposing the appeal is subject to UCA section 78-36-11,

ten day appeal period.

Was this period complied with?

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(e), " whenever
a party x . .

. x is required to do some act within a prescribed

period after the service of a Notice x . . . x upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall be
added to the prescribed period".

Since the Judgment was dated the

10fth day of September, the three days plus the ten days would take
the due date of the Appeal period to September 23frd.

Appellants,

Salazars filed their Chapter 13 Bankruptcy on September the 21'st.

-8-

Bankruptcy automatically stayed the tolling of the clock on the
Appeal for the appellants Gary C. Salazar and Peggy C. Salazar
which stay was released by the signing of the Order of Relief from
Automatic Stay by the Bankruptcy Judge on September 25'th (Appendix
V) and filed by the Appellee with the Circuit Court on September
26fth. This being the first day that appellant had knowledge that
the stay was released by the Bankruptcy Court.

The Appeal was

immediately filed on September 26, 1990, along with a Supersedeas
Appeal Bond which then had been accepted as to form and amount by
the Court.
Since the Automatic Stay stopped the tolling of time on the
Appeal from the 21fst to the 25fth or 26'th, this would have made
the appeal deadline as the 27fth or 28fth of September well within
the timing for Appeal.
14. What effect did appellants non arguing the effect of the
Bankruptcy on staying the time of Appeal have on extending the time
limit?
The meeting time with Appel lant before the Court was shortened
by mutual consent of appellee with the Appellant, but at the time
the shortening of the time for the hearing was communicated to
appellants counsel, the hearing was to be on the appropriateness of
the Supersedeas Bond not on the Motion to Strike Appeal. Appellant
was caught by surprise that this Motion was before the Court. The
fact of the filing for Bankruptcy was given by Appellee's counsel
and was before the Court.

Therefore the striking of the Appeal

should be overruled by the Court.

-9-

CONCLUSION

This action was brought as one in equity and therefore the Appeal
period should have been thirty days which would have made the
Appeal of September 26, 1990 timely.
If the Court finds that this was in fact a Statutory Unlawful
Detainer action, then the fact that the Complaint left open the
question of

damages

if the

sell

of Appellee

failed

because

Appellant stayed on the premises made it an equity action and
therefore made this an action subject to the thirty day rule.
The Appeal should be reinstated because it was filed within
the ten day period.

If you took into consideration the additional

three days for mailing and the four days during which the Automatic
Stay of the Bankruptcy Court was in effect, the Appeal was filed
timely and certainly as soon as Appellants could legally file it.
Under any of the theories, the Appellants filed their Appeal
as soon as the Stay was lifted.
THEREFORE, for the above reasons the Circuit Court1s Order
Striking defendants Appeal should be overruled and the Circuit
Court ordered to send the Appeal and records on to the Court of
Appeals.

The Court should also rule on whether the lower court

acted properly in denying Appellants right of filing a Supersedeas
Bond.
Respectfully so requested this 14fth day of November, 1991.

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14'th day of November, 1991, I
mailed a true and correct copy, postage prepaid of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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DATE

MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: 968-3501 or 968-8282

jfrfr. ^90-?..J:,jb5a*g**

UPON
SANDY P R H i
OEPUTY

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

t SUMMONS
(Three-Day)

vs.
GARY SALAZAR, MRS. GARY SALAZAR
and JOHN OR JANE DOES #1-10,
Defendants

: Civil No.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in
writing to the attached Complaint with the clerk of the above
court, which is located at 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah
84107,

a written answer to the attached complaint, and to serve

upon or mail to the plaintiff's attorney at 3535 South 3200 West,
West Valley City, Utah 84119 a copy of your answer within 3 days
after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in the complaint, which has
been filed with the clerk of the above court and a copy of which
is attached and herewith served upon you.

-R.

ORDER
It appearing to the Court that good cause exists therefor,
and pursuant to statute,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time to answer or otherwise
plead to Plaintiff's Complaint in the above-entitled action shall
be shortened to three (3) days from the date of service.
DATED this

' ^

*j

^

,v^

day of

1990

BY THE
7

&

CIRCUIT COURT JUDSfi fj
Serve Defendant(s) at:
1886 FOXMOOR CIRCLE
SANDY UTAH 84092

TH\?V

MIKBL M. BOLEY (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
968-3501 or 968-8282
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

i

C O M P L A I N T

vs.
GARY SALAZAR, MRS.SALAZAR and
JOHN OR JANE DOES #1-10,
Defendants.

* Civil No.

For cause of action against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges
as follows:
1.

That Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah; that the property in question is located in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah; and that less than TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($10,000.00) is at issue herein..
2.

That the true names and capacities; whether individual,

corporate, children, relatives, associates or otherwise; of
Defendants Doe #1-10 are unknown to Plaintiff, who, therefore
sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.

Plaintiff will

seek leave of the Court to amend this complaint and set forth
said Defendants' true names when said have been ascertained.
3.

That on May 8, 1990, pursuant to a previously executed

Deed of Trust and pursuant to Section 57-1-27, Utah Code
Annotated, a Trustee's Sale was held as to the real property
located at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Utah.

4.

That at said Trustee's Sale, Plaintiff purchased

said

real property and was granted a Trustee's Deed, which was later
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
5.

That as a result of said Trustee's Sale and Trustee's

Deed, Plaintiff

became

the owner

of

said

real

property

and

real

Defendants became tenants at will of Plaintiff.
6.
property
consent

That Defendants have

retained

occupancy

in said

to the present

but have

not done

so with

time

of Plaintiff, nor have

Defendants paid

any

the

rentals

to

Plaintiff.
7.

That due to Defendants' refusal to vacate the premises

in question, Plaintiff did cause to be served upon Defendants a
Notice To Quit Premises.

A true and correct copy of said Notice

To Quit Premises is attached

hereto as Exhibit

"AH

and

hereby

made a part hereof as if fully set forth.
8.

That Defendants still retain possession of said premises

and are now in unlawful detention thereof.
9.

That the reasonable daily rental value of said premises

is $35.00.
10.

That Plaintiff presently has a prospective buyer for

the premises in question.
11.

That Defendants or some of Defendants have interferred

with said sale and have refused to cooperate with Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's agents regarding said sale.
12.
complaint

That Plaintiff

reserves

in the event that said

the right to amend

sale

falls

through

actions of Defendants, resulting in a loss to Plaintiff.

this

due

to

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment and relief against
Defendants jointly and severally as follows:
(a)

For an Order granting to Plaintiff restitution and

possession of the premises lcoated at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy,
Utah 84092.
(b)

For Judgment against Defendants in the sum of $1330.00

for the 38 days Defendants have held possession after sale and
prior to service of this Notice to Quit and for the additional
sum of $105.00 per day from the date of service of the Notice To
Quit until Plaintiff actually retakes possession.
(c)
(d)

For Plaintiff's costs of Court herein incurred.
For such other and further relief as to the Court

seems proper.
DATED this 28th dav af June, /J99^-

~7?&LI
/0.
fid,..
MIKEL M. BOLEY - Bax No. fe375
Attorney for Plaintiff J
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Plaintiff's Address:
3540 South 4000 West Suite 430
West Valley City, Utah 84120

OWNER'S NOTICE TO QUIT PREMISES

TO:

Gary Salazar and any other
tenants in possession of
1886 Foxmoor Circle
Sandy / Utah 84092

UPON
SANDY
DEPUTY

YOU A R E HEREBY
after

this

Notice

NOTIFIED

is

served

AND R E Q U I R E D
upon

you

to

within

vacate

ten

the

(10)

days

above-listed

premises and to take all of your personal belongings with you.
As

you

know,

said

premises

Consumer Finance, who received
of a sale held May 8, 1990.

are

now

the

title to said

property

of

premises as a

Ford
result

You no longer hold either title or any

other legal claim to said premises.
If you
lawsuit

will

Finance

will

fail
be
seek

to vacate

within

commenced

against

reasonable

the
you

rentals

time

set

in

which

from

May

8,

forth

above, a

Ford

Consumer

1990

until

the

service of this Notice and for the recovery of treble (three times)
rents for any days thereafter until you vacate the premises.
DATED this 14th day of June, 1990

MIKEL M. B0LEY
T
Attorney for Ford Consumer Finance
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
968-8282 or 968-3501
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APPENDIX

II.

WESLEY SINE (2967)
Attorney for Defendant
647 W. No. Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,

Plaintiff,
-vsGARY SALAZAR, MRS, SALAZAR and
JOHN OR JANE DOES # 1-10,
Defendants.

+

+
+
X

A N S W E R

+
+
+
+
+

^ ?r:
civil JNO. _7c.

Comes now the Defendant and answers Plaintiff's allegations
contained in his complaint, as follows:
1.

Defendant admits Plaintiff's paragraph number one.

2.

Defendant neither admits nor denies Plaintiff's paragraph

number two.
3.

Defendant does not know for a fact that the actions contained

in Plaintiff's paragraphs three, four and five took place.

If they

did, then Defendant denies that they were properly done under the law
and that by subsequent acts has abbrogated the sell, in that Plaintiff's
agent, Jerry Powers, mislead and misrepresented to Defendant Gary
Salazar that he would stop the Sheriff Sale upon certain actions being
fullfilled by Defendant Salazar.

That while Salazar was conversing

with and negoiating with Powers, the sell (supposedly) was accomplished.
That said Plaintiff's agent Jerry Powers by fraud did keep Salazar
away from the sell and did mislead same, thereby voiding said sell
if it actually did go through.

That

subsequently to the sell and to

the notice to vacate the property, Plaintiff has accepted $15,000.00
toward what is owed on the home and credited it towards the balance due.
Therefore Defendant's deny paragraphs # Three, Four and Five.

4.

Defendant's admit that they have retained possession of the

real property but deny that they have received proper notice to move
from the property and alledge that Plaintiff's have received adequate
fa/ids to cure what ever breach existed and that Plaintiff's have
credited Defendants account for the amount owed. Therefore Defendant
denies Plaintiff's paragraph numbers six, seven, and eight.
5.

Defendant's admit paragraph # 9, and denies paragraph #'s

ten, eleven and twelve.
WHEREFORE, Defendant's request that Plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed and for such judgment and relief as the court may deem
proper under the premises.
Dated this 9th day of Junly, 1990.

//?.jj ^ L
WESLEY SINE Attorney for Defendants
Telephone 801-364-5125
647 W. North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Plaintiff's Address:
647 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

\
ss
County of Salt Lake)
Comes now Gary Salazar, after first being duly sworn and deposes
and says that:
1. On May 8, 1990, that he meet wilh Jerry Powers an:, agent
and representative oi the Plaintiff who negoiated with him to put
off the sale of the property that is a part of this lawsuit, and led
him to believe that the Sale was put off until after the time was spent
after which he said that it was now too late and the sale was done.
2. That on or about the 27th day of June, 1990, he received a
receipt from Ford Consumer Finance Company that $15,000.00*had been
credited to his account for 1886 Foxmoor Cir, Sandy, Utah. This
property being the property subject to the above lawsuit.
3. That it is his belief that the plaintiff had by so accepting
said payment reinstated his property.
DATED this 9th day of July, 1990.

STATE OF UTAH

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of July, 1990.

See Exhibit A

M<< .,7

T-1
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NOTARY PUBLIC'residing
C'residing in
in Salt
Lake County, Utah Commission expires
10-27-91

EXHIBIT A

aSfi^k

3S40 S «4000 WEST SUITEM30
iEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120

DATE 0b/2t/10

H

OFFICE NO. Ofi-MM-0132
ACCOUNT NO. 1QT100
HOUARD D SHERWOOD
Iflflb FOXHOOR CIR
SANDY UT

aMo^a

FORD CONSUflER FINANCE
COflPANY
TUAfUk'

VAII

C A O WAIIO

orrrAit

nivinriiT

DATE RECEIVED
0b/2b/1Q
DATE DUE
04/20/^0
AflOUNT RECEIVED 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
PRINCIPAL Af10UNT15,0aa.0a
INTEREST OR
LATE CHARGES PAID
.00
NEW BALANCE
122,071.?t

APPENDIX

III.

MIKBL M. BOLEY (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
968-8282 or 968-3501
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
:
vs.
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR,
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR,
Defendants.
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No: 903007491CV
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON

The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial before
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Circuit Court Judge, on the 6th
day of September, 1990.

Plaintiff was present through its agent,

Gerald L. Powers, and represented
Boley;

Defendant Gary Salazar

was

by its attorney, Mikel M.
present:

Defendants

Gary

Salazar and Peggy Salazar were represented by their attorney,
Wesley Sine.

Prior to proceeding

the Court did sign an order

substituting "Peggy Salazar" for "Mrs. Gary Salazar" and adding
Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar as Defendants in place of the Doe
Defendants, although the Court specifically held that the hearing
would only affect the rights of Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar to
inhabit the premises
them.

and not allow for a money judgment against

Witnesses were called, testimony was received, exhibits

were presented into evidence; the cause was argued to the Court
and thereafter submitted
decision.

to the Court

The Court being

for consideration

fully advised

and

in the premises, and

upon motion of Mikel M. Boley the Corut now makes the follov/ing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That title to the premises

located

at 1886

Foxmoor

Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is in the name of
Ford Consumer Finance, pursuant

to a Trustee's Deed

dated and

recorded 5/8/90.
2.

That Defendants Salazar have no written claim to said

premises, but claim an interest through a verbal agreement with
Howard Sherwood, the previous owner of the premises.
3.

That Defendants Salazar have resided

in said premises

from 8/22/90 to the date of trial.
4.

That Plaintiff properly notified Defendants to quit the

premises.
5.

That Plaintiff

requirements of unlawful

otherwise
detainer

satisfied

regarding

the

statutory

Defendants

and the

premises in question.
6.

That Defendant Gary Salazar did claim that he v/as either

misled or fraudulently induced by Gerald Powers, Plaintiff's
agent, on 5/8/90, not to attend a trustee's sale or to take other
action.
7.

That Gerald Powers did not mislead

or

fraudulently

induce Gary Salazar not to attend or not to take other action on
5/8/90.
8.

That Defendants' claims in equity regarding the fairness

of Plaintiff's actions were not sufficiently proven to justify th*
Courts disallowance

of the Trustee's Deed, although

Plaintiff,

through it attorney, did stipulate at the start of trial that the
Court could so hold and rule, if the evidence so v/arranted.

9.

That Defendants at no time after the initiation of the

foreclosure action, which was done by the filing of a Notice of
Default on 4/28/89, ever brought the account of Howard Sherwood
with Plaintiff current.
10.

That a reasonable rental of the premises is $35.00 per

day.
11.

That Plaintiff

is entitled

to a judgment

against

Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar for $715.00 for the 49
days from 5/8/90 (the date of Plaintiff's ownership) and 6/26/90
(which is 11 days after Defendants were served with a Notice to
Quit Premises) based upon $35.00 per day.
12.

That Plaintiff

is entitled

to a judgment

against

Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $7455.00
for the 71 days from 6/27/90 to 9/6/90, based upon treble damages
of $105.00 per day, plus $105.00 per day until the premises are
vacated by Defendants.
13.

That Plaintiff

is entitled

to

a judgment

against

Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $74.75 as
court costs.
14.

That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of restitution

against all Defendants.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby
makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS 0£ LAW
1.

Plaintiff is the owner of the premises located at 1886

Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, pursuant
to a Trustee's Deed.
2.

Defendants have been tenants at will of Plaintiff since

5/8/90.
3.

Plaintiff properly followed statutory requirements

to

evict Defendants from the premises.
4.

Defendants are in unlawful detention of the premises.

5.

Plaintiff is entitled to a writ of restitution removing

all Defendants and their belongings from the premises.
6.

Plaintiff

is entitled to a judgment against Defendants

Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $9170.00, plus court
costs of $74.75, plus $105.00 per day for any days after 9/6/90,
that Defendants remain in the premises.
DATED this

day of

1990.

BY THE COURT:
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage
prepaid, this 7th day of September, 1990, addressed as follows:
WESLEY SINE, ESQ.

647 WEST NORTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116

11IKEL 11. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

APPENDIX I V .

MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
968-8282 or 968-3501
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT, JUDGMENT FOR
RESTITUTION OF PREMISES,
AND DECLARING FORFEITURE
OF TENANCY

GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR,
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR
Defendants.

Civil No: 903007491CV
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON

The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial before
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Circuit Court Judge, on the 6th
day of September, 1990.

Plaintiff was present through its agent,

Gerald L. Powers, and represented
Boley;

Defendant Gary Salazar

was

by its attorney, Mikel 11.
present;

Defendants

Salazar and Peggy Salazar were represented by their
Wesley Sine.
substituting

Prior to proceeding

Gary

attorney

the Court did sign an order

"Peggy Salazar" for "Mrs. Gary Salazar" and adding

Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar as Defendants in place of the Doe
Defendants, although the Court specifically held that the hearing
would only affect the rights of Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar to
inhabit the premises and not allow for a money judgment against
them.

Witnesses were called, testimony was received, exhibits

were presented into evidence; the cause was argued to the Court

and thereafter submitted
decision.

to the Court for consideration

and

The Court being fully advised in the premises, having

previously made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now upon Motion of Mikel M. Boley, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

that Plaintiff Ford Consumer

Finance do have and is hereby granted judgment against Defendants
as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff

do have and recover

judgment

from the

Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of NINE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS

($9,170.00) for

regular rental and treble damages through 9/6/90.
2.

That Plaintiff

do have and recover

judgment

from

Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar for treble rent in the
sum of ONE HUNDRED FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($105.00) per day from
9/6/90 per day until Defendants vacate said premises.
3.

That all Defendants are guilty of unlawful detainer of

the premises at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County,
Utah, and that a writ of restitution issue therefore
and that any interest of Defendants

forthwith

to lease or tenant

premises be and the same is hereby forfeited and terminated.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

1990.

said

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT, JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTIONOF PREMISES, AND
DECLARING FORFEITURE OF TENANCY, postage prepaid, this 7th day of
September, 1990, addressed as follows:

WESLEY SINE, ESQ

647 WEST NORTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116

> ^ y ^ <<
MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

APPENDIX V.

ttJKEL M. BOLEY (037 5)
Attorney for Ford Consumer Finance
3535 South 3200 West
West V a l l e y C i t y , Utah 84119
9 6 8 - 8 2 3 2 or 9 6 3 - 3 5 0 1

OFFICE O F JUDGE
GLfcN £ CLARK

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
In

re:

GARY CURTIS SALA2AR
and PEGGY COON SALAZAR
Debtors.

ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
FROli AUTOMATIC STAY
Bankruptcy No: 90C-O5730
Chapter 13

The Ex. Parte iiotion For Relief From Automatic Stay of Ford
Consumer Finance came before the Honorable Glen E . Clark,
Bankruptcy
Based

Court Judge

in his chambers on September

25, 1990.

upon the verified motion, for good cause shov/n and upon

motion of Mikel M. Boley, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Automatic Stay is hereby partially lifted
as follows:

Ford Consumer Finance shall be entitled to proceed

with its eviction proceedings seeking the restitution of the
following

real property

located

in Salt Lake County, State of

Utah:
Lot 62, BRANDON PARK NO. 1, as recorded in the official
plat thereof in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office

DATED this

2. f~

da

Y of Sept ember, 1990.
BY THE COURT

sreby certify that the annexed and foregoipdZ X
y ^ V ^
^/
w ^
i /S^/fr*-^
\ true —
and ww...
complete
copy
of
a
documcnfofL
*
-£^<
f
'^—'—«v *
K,*,lo «-w^/y ui d document on. -"- ^^
m the United States ' Bankruptcy 5 o u r F P T C Y C 0 U R T J U D G *
the District o t U t a h f - r — - Z.
o 9Dated: %-& ^ - '
^
. ^ n ^ V ^ nut™***'
Attest: :.
..^...
.
g , n /SJC / ^ c ^ c * - & * v *
DeDUtv'Of

k — " ~ ~

SANDY P f E C J M l , ^ ^ COUNTY. UTAH

WESLEY SINE (2967)
Attorney for Defendant
647 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone (801) 3645125

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil # 903007491 CV

GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR,
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR,
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, GABE
SALAZAR, AND CHAD SALAZAR, Defendants above named, hereby

appeal

to the COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH from the Judgment,
Judgment for Restitution of premises, and Declaring
of Tenancy entered in this action on September
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County

Forfeiture

10, 1990 in the

(Murray Division),

/^WESXEYSINE

17'

Attorney for Appellant
647 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

APPENDIX V I .

>:. B O L E Y (0375)
At* .r.-y for Plaintiff
"r * r uth 3200 West
\;~
"alley City, Utah 84119
?•: " " !£2 or 968-3501

I::PT:

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR,
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR,
Defendants.
:

Civil No: 903007491CV
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Appeal came on for hearing and
disposition

10/1/90, before the Honorable

Circuit Court Judge.
Mikel M. Boley.
Wesley Sine.
advised

Michael

K.

Burton,

Plaintiff was represented by its attorney,

Defendants were represented by their attorney,

The cause was argued to the Court, which was fully

in the premises.

Whereupon, for good

cause

upon motion of Mikel M. Boley, the Court does hereby

shown

and

make and

enter the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The pending action was based

completely

in unlawful

detainer and not partially upon some other theory or basis.
2.

Defendants did not file their appeal within

days of either the date of entry
Defendants of entry of judgment.

of

judgment

ten

(10)

or of notice

to

In the event that Defer:1.-:: 5 should appeal this rul:r^

3,

and ultimate]y

succeed

in havir; :h*ir previously

filed

av: " "

heard, and should Defendants prevail on said appeal, and should
an higher Court order that Defendants can move back into th~
premises

in quesion, Plaintiff

expenses reasonably

should

pay

for

the

costs

»nd

incurred by Defendants in moving out and in

moving back into said premises.
4,

Defendants must vacate the premises

no later than 12:OC

Noon on or about 10/5/90, whether or not this ruling is appealed.
5,

Should Defendants appeal this ruling, there will be no

stay of proceeding nor will a Supersedeas bond be accepted.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now
enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF. LAW
1.

Defendants were

attempting

to appeal

the

judgment

in

this unlawful detainer but did not do so within ten (10) days.
2.

Defendants' failure to file an appeal within ten

(10}

days is jurisdictional, and the appeal cannot take place.
3.

Defendants' appeal should be denied and sticken.

4.

To protect Defendants in the event they appeal

this

decision and in the event they prevail on their original appeal
and are allowed to re-occupy the premises in question, Defendants
should

file a $10,000.00 bond to cover Defendants' expenses in

moving out and back into the premises.

5.
than

I r: *. ;r'iints are ordered to v^ . -t.t ti ie premises n • ater

j?:Cr

Kc.n

on

10/5/90,

whethe:

r not

this I U 1 ; r. 2 is

appealed.
6.

There shall

ther stay or proceedings ,:

this

matter, v;hether Defendants appeal or not.

DATED this

day of October, 1990,
BY THE COURT:

f^UJx^rL^
CIRCU

MAILING CERTIFICATE
hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAV/, postage
prepaid, this 2nd day of October, 1990, addressed as follows:
WESLEY SINE, ESQ.

647 WEST NORTH TEHPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116

MIKEL H. B O L E Y V
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119
968-8282 or 968-3501

1IIKEL I!. BOLEY (0375 ,
Attorney for Plaintiff
2525 South 2200 West
'Jest Valley City, Utah 34119
9b.c-82£l or 9 6 G - 2 5 0 1
CIRCUIT COURT. STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, HURRAY DEPARTMENT
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE,
a Corporation.
Plaintiff,

ORDER STRIKING
DEFENDANTS AFFEAL

GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR,
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR,
Defendants.

Civil No: 902007491CV
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON

Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Appeal came on for hearing and
disposition on October 1, 1990. before the Honorable Michael K.
Burton, Circuit Court Judge.
attorney, Mikel M. Boley.
attorney Uesley Sine.

Plaintiff was represented by its

Defendants were represented by their

The matter was argued by the attorneys and

submitted to the Court for its disposition.

Whereupon, for good

cause shown, based upon the failure of Defendants

to appeal

within ten days as required by Utah Code Section 78-36-11. and
upon motion of llikel 11. Boley. it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendants' appeal be and
and denied.
DATED this

/

day of October^

CIRCU

is hereby

stricken
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The majority finds "no evidence whatsoever of a rigid or inflexible application of
the in-person-contact requirement." To the
contrary, the rigid syllogistic reasoning of
the appeals referee is evident from the face
of his written opinion. The referee only
notes that Ms. Payotelis had been aware of
the requirement to make at least two or
three in-person contacts to prospective employers each week and that she had failed
to meet this requirement between October
3 and October 23. He then summarily concludes that she had not met the eligibility
requirements of the Department of Employment Security for three weeks in October. No analysis of Ms. Payotelis' particular circumstances and no response to her
attorney's arguments are contained in the
referee's written decision. The language
of the referee's opinion quoted by the majority refers only to the period after November 28 and is not applicable to the
earlier period.
I would overrule the Department's decision denying benefits from October 3, 1982,
through October 23, 1982, and eliminate
the resulting assessment of an overpayment. There may be some special merit to
an in-person contact as opposed to a phone
call, and I do not question the expertise of
the Department of Employment Security in
this respect. However, it does appear from
the facts of this case that Ms. Payotelis,
based on her experience in the business,
intelligently and prudently conserved her
resources by calling ahead to discover
whether a personal visit would prove
worthwhile. I can see little sense in refusing to allow the use of the telephone in
those cases where it is appropriate and
instead requiring people of limited means
to knowingly waste their last dollars on
certainly futile personal contacts. If the
Department has some reason for requiring
this, it should state it in the context of
these facts. The opinion of the appeals
referee is a mechanical application of a
requirement that in this case has been
shown to be irrelevant and futile. I would
reverse.

FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and Elgin Williams,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, a linv
ited partnership, and Bob Garwood,
Defendants and Appellants.

FASHIONS FOUR v. FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES
ment without consent of lessor confers no
rights upon assignee.
4. Landlord and Tenant «»76(3)
Reassignment of lease by assignee
back to original lessee under unexpired
lease did not require consent of lessor under lease requiring consent of lessor to
transfer or assignment of rights to third
persons.

No. 18194.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 18, 1984.
Lessor appealed from a judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., enjoining it from interfering with lessee's possession of premises.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that
reassignment of lease by assignee back to
original lessee under unexpired lease did
not require consent of lessor under lease
requiring consent of lessor to transfer or
assignment of rights to third persons.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <5»351(1)
Where lessee's complaint against lessor contained four causes of action, including claims for forcible entry and detainer
and damages for breach of the lease, appeal from order awarding general damages
to lessee was not governed by statute requiring appeal to be filed within ten days
from date of entry of judgment for forcible
entry and detainer. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-10,
78-36-11; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 73(a).
2. Landlord and Tenant <s=79(l)
Upon assignment, privity of estate terminates between lessor and lessee and
arises between lessor and assignee; however, privity of contract between lessor and
lessee continues until expiration of the
lease.
3. Landlord and Tenant <s=>75(3)
Assignment of lease back to original
lessee is excepted from rule that assign-
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Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and respondents.

session pending the outcome of the trial.
The trial court awarded Fashions Four
damages and attorney fees and permanently enjoined Fashion Place from interfering
with Fashions Four's possession of the
premises under the terms of the lease.
Fashion Place appeals, contending that
as a matter of law the reassignment of the
lease from Davidson to Fashions Four was
without force and effect because it had not
given its consent under Article 15. Fashions Four also claims that this Court is
without jurisdiction to hear this appeal inasmuch as Fashion Place failed to file its
appeal within ten days from the date of
entry of judgment for forcible entry and
detainer as required by U.C.A., 1953,
§ 78-36-11. We first address this threshold issue.

HOWE, Justice:
This appeal involves the reassignment of
a lease that had been entered into between
plaintiff, Fashions Four Corporation (Fash[1] Fashions Four's verified complaint
ions Four), as lessee, and defendant Fash- contained four causes of action, asking for
ion Place Associates (Fashion Place), as treble damages for forcible entry and delessor.
tainer under the first two causes of action,
Fashion Place was the lessor and Fash- a temporary restraining order and tempoions Four was the lessee under a ten-year rary injunction under the third, and damlease dated May 6, 1974, for premises at ages for breach of the lease under the
the Fashion Place Mall, commercially fourth. Fashion Place filed its counterknown as "Charlie's." Article 15 of the claim, likewise containing four causes of
lease provided for the lessor's written con- action, asserting wrongful reoccupation by
sent to any assignment by the lessee. In Fashions Four, asking for declaratory reSeptember of 1978, Fashions Four assigned lief in striking the temporary restraining
its lease to Norsal Development Corpora- order, as well as for an expedited trial
tion. Fashion Place consented. In Novem- setting. The remedy for forcible entry and
ber of 1979, ownership of Norsal was ac- detainer is treble damages and restitution
quired by one Neil Davidson, who contin- of premises. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-36-10.
ued the operation of Charlie's without any Conversely, judgment was entered in favor
objection by Fashion Place. By June of of Fashions Four for general damages
1981, the business had failed, Davidson only, a permanent injunction and a dismisswas delinquent in rent, the inventory of al with prejudice of Fashion Place's counCharlie's had been attached, and a sheriffs terclaim. Consequently, we are compelled
sale was scheduled to satisfy creditors. to conclude that the hybrid nature of plainDavidson negotiated with Fashions Four tiffs action, containing additional declarafor the repossession of the premises and tory and equitable causes, and of the dethe reassignment of the lease to Fashions fendant's counterclaim with similar causes,
Four. Fashion Place changed the locks on prevents § 78-36-11 from controlling the
June 19 and denied Fashions Four access to time for appeal. Belnap v. Fox, et ai, 69
toe premises on the ground that Fashion Utah 15, 251 P. 1073 (1927); Dunbar, et at.
'acJ^had not consented to the reassign- v. Hanson, et ai, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982
^ejrbf the lease. Fashions Four obtained (1926); Oppenheimer, et ai v. Mountain
* temporary restraining order against States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190. 188 P.
p
ashion Place, which put it back into pos- 1117 (1920). Instead, the appeal is gov-
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STATE v NEWTON
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erned by Utah R Civ P 73(a) and was
therefore perfected tn timely fashion We
proceed to the merits of the case
The central issue to be decided here is
whether the lessor's consent in writing is
necessary before an assignee may assign a
lease back to the original lessee for the
unexpired term of the lease This is a case
of first impression in our forum
Article 15 of the lease agreement provides in pertinent part as follows
The tenant shall not transfer, assign,
sublet
this Lease or the tenant's interest in and to the premises without
first procuring the written consent of the
landlord Any attempted transfer, assignment, subletting
without the
landlord's written consent shall be void
and confer no rights upon any third person [Emphasis ours ]
Article 35 G provides m pertinent part
Landlord's consent to or approval of
any act by tenant requiring landlord's
consent or approval shall not be deemed
to waive or render unnecessary landlord's consent to or approval of any subsequent similar act by tenant
Fashion Place contends that, construing
these articles m harmony, its consent to the
earlier assignment did not operate to waive
a subsequent required consent Fashion
Place buttresses this argument by invoking
public policy considerations and pointing to
the intent of the parties under contractual
provisions Specifically, Fashion Place argues that the consent to assignment provision is designed to serve two purposes, one,
to reject contractually the common law rule
that leaseholds are freely assignable, and
two, and more importantly, to insure that
the lessor has a responsible tenant to look
to for performance of the lease From that
thesis Fashion Place then derives its conclusion that once the original lessee assigns
its lease to an assignee, the lessor must
have the opportunity to pass on the qualifications of all potential tenants, including
those of the original tenant under the unex
pired lease We disagree

[2,3) The language of Article 15 clearly
states the parties' objectives m requiring
the lessor's consent to assignment Unless
that consent is given, no rights are conferred upon third persons We agree with
Fashion Place that the assignment or transfer of a lease interest by a tenant is of
critical importance to a lessor of an enclosed shopping mall and that its consent
gives it the requisite control to create the
optimum commercial environment for all
mall tenants However, once certain rights
have been conferred upon the lessee, those
rights may not be vitiated absent a breach
of covenant by the lessee Only the rights
of assignees of the lessee may be defeated
bv an assignment without consent The
purport of the contractual language is
clear It expressly excepts from the consent to assignment an assignment back to
the original lessee who does not qualify as
a third person under the terms of the lease
in which he is a contracting party Upon
assignment pnvitv of estate terminates between lessor and lessee and arises between
lessor and assignee However, pnvity of
contract between the lessor and the lessee
continues until the expiration of the lease
Broida v Hayashi, 51 Hawaii 493, 464
P 2d 285 (1970) It follows that an assignment back to the original lessee is excepted
from the rule that an assignment without
consent of lessor confers no rights upon
the assignee \bsent a release by the lessor, the original lessee remains ''able for
the performance by its assignee of the covenant to pav rent Kintner v Harr, 146
Mont 461, 408 P 2d 487 (1965) Where
that burden persists, the concomitant benefit should likewise obtain, allowing the lessee to step into the shoes of the assignee
whose performance has been placed in jeopardy The rationale for the exception has
been stated as follows
The covenant by the lessee, that he or
others having his estate in the premises
will not assign this lease without the
written consent of the lessor, does not bv
its true construction extend so far as to
prohibit a reassignment to the lessee
himself without a new and special con
sent of the lessor By the lease itself,

the lessor consents to take the lessee as
his tenant for the full term mentioned m
the lease This consent is available for
any reassignment to the original lessee
during the term There is therefore no
breach of the covenant The statement
that the reassignment has never been
consented to, means only that no special
consent has been given, and this is unnecessary
G Thompson, Thompson on Real Property
(1981 Replacement) Volume 3A 9 l2i3, citing McCormick v Stouell, 138 Massachusetts 431, 433-34 (1885), see also Coulos v
Desiynone, 34 Wash 2d 87, 208 P 2d 105
(1949)
[4] We hold that the assignment by
Davidson back to Fashions Four as the
original lessee under the unexpired lease
was not contingent upon the consent of
Fashion Place and that the trial court properly reinstated Fashions Four in the lease
hold premises The judgment below is affirmed with costs awarded to Fashions
Four
HALL, C J , and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ, concur
IlTNUMItXVriltM
^niuO

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jay Richard NEWTON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19065.
Supreme Court of Utah
April 23, 1984
Defendant was convicted m the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis
Fredrick, J , of aggravated robbery, and he
a
p a l e d The Supreme Court, Oaks, J ,

Utah 8 3 3

(Utah 1984)

held that refusal to give a proffered instruction stressing the special pitfalls of
eyewitness identification was not prejudicial error where the witness, who had
about three minutes to observe the unmasked defendant, most of the time at a
close range and in a store that was well
illuminated, was positive in her identification
Affirmed
Durham, J , concurred in the result
and filed opinion in which Stewart, J , concurred
Criminal Law <s»1173 2(5)
Refusal to give a proffered instruction
stressing the special pitfalls of eyewitness
identification was not prejudicial error
where the witness, who had about three
minutes to observe the unmasked defendant, most of the time at a close range and
in a store that was well illuminated, was
positive in her identification
Bradley P Rich, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen, J. Stephen MiWtta, Asst Atty Gen, James F.
Housley, Deputy Salt Lake County Atty,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent
OAKS, Justice.
A jury convicted defendant ot aggravated robbery U C A , 1953, § 76-6-302
The only evidence linking defendant to the
crime was the eyewitness identification of
the victim On appeal, defendant claims
that the trial court committed prejudicial
error by refusing his proffered instruction
stressing the special pitfalls of eyewitness
identification See United States v Tel/aire, 469 F 2d 552 (D C Cir 1972) We affirm
During the morning of May 6, 1981, Sandra Shephard, a registered pharmacist with
22 years' experience, was working at Salt
Lake Drug East She saw a man enter the
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Counsel call attention to the principle that, if a party detaining property did not use same, the deterioration which
it would have suffered \ v use as the owner would have used
it must be deducted from the value of the use, and that in
this case no deduction was made because of deterioration.
This issue was not raised by defendant's answer. No instruction was requested upon the subject, and in no way*
is the question before us for review. It is apparent that in
the trial court appellant relied wholly upon his contention
that in replevin when the value of the property is fixed at
the time of the taking the damages may not exceed the interest
on such value, and thus relying upon that theory of the case,
counsel logically perceived no reason for raising an issue
which they thought immaterial.
The record discloses no prejudicial error.
The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs to
respondent.

Action by Albert Ottenheimer and others
Mountain States Supply Company.

CORFMAN, C. J., and FRICK, GIDEON, and THURMAN, JJ., concur.

From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant
motion to dismiss appeal.

the benefit of a judgment in his favor or acquiescing in a judgment against him thereby waives his right to have the judgment reviewed on appeal.
3.

APPEAL AND ERROR—SURRENDER OP POSSESSION OF PBOPEBTT IN
DISPUTE HELD TO PREVENT REVIEW. In an action to recover pos-

session of land and quiet title and to recover the reasonable
rental value, defended on the ground that defendant had a lease
at a rental less than the alleged reasonable rental and having
some time to run, defendant's surrender of the premises after an
adverse judgment prevented an appeal by it, as it thereby
abandoned its contention that it had a lease and escaped liability for the rent for the rest of the claimed term.
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake
County; P . C. Evans, Judge.
against the

appeals. On

A P P E A L DISMISSED.

O T T E N H E I M E R et al v. MOUNTAIN S T A T E S
S U P P L Y CO.
No. 3419. Decided March 30, 1920. Rehearing denied April 24,
1920. (188 Pac. 1117.)
1.

APPEAL AND ERBOB—RESPONDENTS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT AP-

PEAL WAS NOT TAKEN IN TIME.

APPEAL AND ERROR—ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS OR ACQUIESCENCE

IN JUDGMENT DEFEATS APPEAL.

F. C. Loofbourow and Dey, Hoppaugh
jake City, for respondents.

<& Mark, all of Salt

FRICK, J .

In an action in which the first

count sought recovery of real property and the second count
asked that plaintiff's title to an adjoining strip be quieted,
where the case was tried and submitted and determined as an
action in equity, plaintiffs could not assert that it was other
than one in equity, as the basis for a motion to dismiss the
appeal, because not taken in time, though the relief prayed for
in the first cause of action could have been recovered in an
action of forcible detainer.
2.

C. E. Norton, of Salt Lake City, for appellant,

A party to an action accepting

Two causes of action are stated in the complaint. In the
rst one plaintiffs seek to recover possession of certain real
roperty, describing it, the possession of which, it is alleged,
wrongfully withheld from the plaintiffs by the defendant,
id for damages for withholding the same. In the second
use of action plaintiffs seek to quiet title to a certain strip
ground which adjoins the property involved in the first
use of action, and it is asked that the defendant be re-
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quired to set forth its claim, if any it has. The defendant,
in its answer to the complaint, denied the allegations of the
complaint, and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that it held
the property in question by virtue of a lease which u had
obiained from plaintiffs' grantors by the terms of which it
was entitled to the possession of the premises in question at
a specified rental for a fixed period of time which would not
expire for several years. By way of counterclaim it further
alleged that pursuant to the terms of the lease it had made
improvements and betterments on the devised premises to the
value of $2,000. It prayed that the plaintiffs' action be dismissed; that it be adjudged that the defendant has a valid
lease upon the premises aforesaid under which it is entitled to
possession thereof until May 1, 1923, and that it recover the
value of said alleged improvements. The plaintiffs, in their
reply, denied the material averments of the answer and counterclaim, and mure fully explained the reasons why the defendant is not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid

be heard to say that the action was other than one in
equity. There is no merit to the motion to dismiss the appeal
upon the ground stated therein, and hence the motion should
be, and it accordingly is, denied.
Some time after the cause was submitted on the appeal
plaintiffs' counsel made application to this court for leave to
file another motion to dismiss the appeai upon the ground
that the defendant had abandoned its appeal, and hence had
waived its right to have the judgment reviewed by this court.
That motion is grounded upon the following proceedings:
The judgment, or decree as it is designated in the record,
awarded plaintiffs the possession of the property mentioned in
the first cause of action, and also awarded them the sum of
$2,400 "damages • # • for withholding the possession
of said premises." The court also quieted the title to the strip
of property before referred to and described in the complaint
of plaintiffs, and* awarded them costs. The defendant appealed from the judgment "and from the whole thereof."
After the cause had" been submitted the defendant served
notice upon plaintiffs' counsel as follows:
"To the Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys: Please take notice that
pursuant to your notice to vacate and the order of said court requiring said defendant to vacate the premises described in the
complaint in the above-entitled action the defendant has vacated
said premises and here delivers possession thereof without waiving
any of its claims against said plaintiffs, or against the Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company, or against the City Trust & Investment
Company, or against any of them, by reason of being required to
vacate said premises contrary to the terms of the said leases named
and set forth in its answer and counterclaim herein."
Immediately upon serving that notice plaintiffs' counsel
asked and obtained leave to file the additional motion to dismiss the appeal before referred to.
It is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts
the benefits of a judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a
judgment against him he thereby waives his right to have
8a
id judgment reviewed on appeal. 2 Cyc. 644; 3 C. J. p.
665, section 536. In the same volume of Cyc, at page 556,
it is said:
Any act on the part of a defendant by which he impliedly recog-

property.
A trial to the court resulted in findings of fact and conclusions of law m favor of the plaintiffs upon which a judgment was entered from which the defendant appeals and
assigns numerous errors.
We are met at the threshold with a motion by plaintiffs
to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that it was not taken
within the time required by our statute. The motion is based
upon the contention that the action is one of forcible detainer under our statute (Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, sections
1713 to 1727, inclusive, and hence that an appeal must be
taken within the time therein specified, which is within ten
days after judgment. While it is true that the relief prayed
for in the first cause of action might have been had in a proceeding of forcible detainer, yet it is also true that the relief
sought and obtained by plaintiffs under the second cause of
action is purely equitable, and could not have been had ia
a forcible detainer action under our statute. Moreover, the
case was tried throughout and submitted to the court, and by
it determined, as an action in equity. The plaintiffs,
therefore, in order to defeat the appeal, may not now
1
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nizes the validity of a judgment against him operates as a waiver
of hia rights to appeal therefrom or bring error to reverse It.'*
In 2 Ency. PL & Pr., at page 174, the rule is stated thus:
"It is a settled doctrine that where a party recovering a judgment
or decree accepts the benefits thereof, voluntarily and knowing the
facts, he is estopped to afterwards reverse the Judgment or decree
on error The acceptance operates as and may be pleaded as a
release of error."
See, also, Elwert v. Marleij, 53 Or. 591, 99 Pac. 887, 101
Pac. 671, 133 Am. St. Rep. 850; Male v. Harlan, 12 S. D. 627,
82 N. W. 179, and Sheldon v. Hotter, 59 Kan. 776, 53 Pac.
127.1
Counsel for the defendant does not dispute or question
the rule as stated in the foregoing citations, and hence
it is not necessary to pursue the subject further.
2
The question, therefore, is, Does this case come
within the rule? As we have seen, the principal question
that was litigated was whether the defendant had a lease to
the premises under which it was entitled to hold possession?
The court found that it had no lease, and therefore continued in possession without authority or law and against
the consent of the plaintiffs, the owners. The further
question as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum of $500 a month for the use of the premises,
or were limited to the sum of $350 a month, the amount
that it is contended was specified in the alleged lease, entirely,
depended upon whether the defendant had the alleged lease
or not. The court found that there was no lease, and hence
found that the amount that defendant should pay was not
fixed by any contract, and therefore it should be required to
pay the reasonable rental value of the premises, which was
$500 a month. In voluntarily surrendering the premises upon
which it claimed to have a lease, defendant necessarily surrendered or waived the right to have the question of whether
it had or had not a subsisting lease on the premises reviewed
by this court. By serving the notice and yielding possession of
i Reported in full in the Pacific Reporter; reported as a memorandum decision without opinion in 59 Kan. 776. ,
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the premises to the owners it in effect intimated that it
did not desire the premises longer, and hence conceded
3
the plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to the possession thereof. Defendant therefore abandoned the question of
whether it had a lease or not, and that question is out of the
case. Now the question whether the defendant should pay $500
as monthly rent or only $350, the amount specified in the alleged lease, again depended upon whether the defendant could
establish that it had a lease. Having surrendered the premises, and thereby abandoned the contention that it had a lease,
it must also be deemed to have abandoned the right to have the
question whether it should pay rent according to the terms of
the alleged lease or in accordance with the judgment reviewed
here. That the adandoning of the question of whether it had
a lease carries with it the question of the payment of rent
seems quite clear. Assuming that this court should find that
the district court erred in holding that defendant did not have
a lease and should find that it had one which would expire
in May, 1923, as contended by the defendant, it would then
follow that the defendant was liable to pay rent for the premises until that time, although it had already surrendered
them. That it was so liable, or might be held liable, is precisely what the defendant escapes by acquiescing in the finding of the court that it had no lease upon the premises. If,
therefore, it escapes liability and concedes that it has no lease,
it likewise must concede that it cannot have the question of
whether it should pay rent according to the lease or in accordance with the court's finding reviewed here. We could
not review the question of rent without necessarily considering the question of whether the defendant had a lease or not.
The question of whether it had a lease being abandoned, the
question of rent goes with it.
To avoid any misunderstanding respecting the scope of this
opinion, we feel constrained to say that we do not hold that
in paying a judgment the defendant is necessarily prevented
from prosecuting an appeal, or that he waives or abandons the
one already taken, but what we do hold is, where, as here, the
acquiescence in the judgment and the surrendering of pos-
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session of the premises necessarily amounts to a waiver of all
the litigated questions, this court is precluded from reviewing
the judgment.
It follows, therefore, that the second motion to dismiss the
appeal should be, and it accordingly is, sustained; and the
appeal is dismissed, at appellant's cost.
CORFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON and THURMAN, J J . , concur.

BIG COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH
SHURTLIFF et ux.
No 3374.
1.

CO. et ai. v.

Decided Nov. 28, 1919. On Modification of Opinion,
April 21, 1920. (189 Pac. 587.)

WATERS AND WATER COIRSES—USERS HEID ENTITLED TO Frow
FOR CULINARY PURPOSES IX AUDITION TO THAT ALLOWEDTORIRRI-

OATION. In an action by an irrigation company against users
of water from its dltchrtfcld, that users were entitled to the
continuous flow they had used for years for culinary and domestic purposes in addition to the quantity awarded for irrigation.*
2.

WATERS AND WATER COURSES—DITCH COMPACT ENTITLED TO
WASTE WATER SAVED BT IMPROVING CONDUIT. 20,000 gallons of

water delivered daily at defendant's home for culinary purposes
held proper, although in excess of amount generally used by
others under similar circumstances, and where, because of
waste of ditch, 323,000 gallons must be released to supply such
amount, It was proper to allow plaintiff irrigation company fbe
privilege to construct an economical conduit and use the water
saved. *
3.

WATERS AND WATEB COURSES—COURTS MAY PERMIT USER TO
CHANGE PRIOR USER'S METHOD OP DIVERSION TO S W E WASTE.

While an original appropriator of water acquires a right In bis
i Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 574, 164
Pac. 856.
* Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 574, 164
Pac. 856.

APPENDIX VIII.

76-5-304

CRIMINAL CODE

Detaining child beyond visitation period.
Parent's detention of child beyond visitation
period did not constitute crime of custodial interference when the child was detained for a
brief period for the purpose of seeking legal
intervention to modify custody award and
there was a good faith belief by parent that he
had good cause, which he substantiated by filing a petition for custody modification and receiving a temporary restraining order to prevent the child's removal from the state until
the custodial issue could be determined
Nielsen v Nielsen, 620 P 2d 511 (Utah 1980)

Violation of custody order a n element.
Subsection (1Mb) criminalizes the conduct of
those who, when exercising visitation or custody under the authority of a custody order, act
to deprive another person of her or his custodial or visitation rights in derogation of that
existing order Even one who is subject to a
custody or visitation decree does not violate
this section unless he or she acts in derogation
of his or her right under the order State v
Smith, 764 P 2d 997 (Utah Ct App 1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . J u r 2d. — 1 Am J u r 2d Abduction
and Kidnaping *} 19
C . J . S . — 51 C J S Kidnapping * 4
A.L.R. — Liability of legal or natural par-
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ent, or one who aids and abets, for damages
resulting from abduction of own child, 49
A L R 4th 7
Key N u m b e r s . — Kidnapping «=> 3

Unlawful detention.

(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-304, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, c h . 196, *} 76-5-304.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Kidnaping a minor.
Unlawful detention is not a lesser included
offense of kidnaping a minor, § 76-5-301 State
v Cross, 649 P 2d 72 (Utah 1982)

ANALYSIS

Elements
Kidnaping a minor
Liability of peace officer
Elements.
For cases discussing definition and elements
of former offense of false imprisonment, see
Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P 653, 26
L R A ( n s ) 9 5 3 , 1912B Ann Cas 1366(1910),
Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P 2d 458
(1962)

Liability of peace officer.
A peace officer would not necessarily be held
liable for mistaking identity of person named
in warrant of arrest if he had exercised reasonable diligence and care in ascertaining identity
before he served warrant Mildon v Bybee, 13
Utah 2d 400, 375 P 2 d 458 (1962)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am J u r 2d False Imprisonment § 151
C . J . S . — 3 5 C J S False Imprisonment § 71
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or inadequacy of
compensatory damages for false imprisonment
or arrest, 48 A L R 4th 165

Penalties for common-law criminal offense of
false imprisonment, 67 A L R 4th 1103
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=»
43
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(c) If the governing body of a municipality establishes a municipal
department of the circuit court, a municipal justice court judge may not
be appointed or elected. The circuit judges are successors of the justice
court judges acting in the municipality where municipal departments of
the circuit court are established.
(2) (a) Governing bodies of municipalities establishing municipal departments of the circuit court may vacate the establishment of the circuit
court by ordinance and return to a municipal justice court.
(b) If a governing body establishes a circuit court or returns to a justice
court system, it shall cause the Office of the State Court Administrator to
be notified in writing within 30 days after the fact.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-6, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, ft 1; 1987, ch. 228, 3 3; 1988, ch.
248, 5 30; 1990, ch. 59, S 31.
Repealed effective January 1, 1992. —
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals § 78-4-6, as
last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 59, § 31, relating to report to court administrator regarding
municipal department of circuit court, effective
January 1, 1992.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted former
Subsection (l)(a) which read "A municipal department of the circuit court is created for all

municipalities which have created city courts.
The circuit court and the judges of them succeed the city courts and have all the powers
and duties of the city judge'*; redesignated the
following subsections accordingly; and made
minor stylistic changes,
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "justice court judge" for "justice of the peace" in the first sentence and "justice court judges" for "justices of the peace" in
the second sentence in Subsection (l)(c) and
substituted "justice court" for "justice of the
peace" twice in Subsection (2).

78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions [Effective until
January 1, 1992].
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if
the sum claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of court costs, except:
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics* liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.

Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions [Effective
January 1, 1992].
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, except:
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics* liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
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(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.
History: C. 1963, 78-4-7, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, 3 1; 1983, ch. 76, 3 1; 1986, ch.
121, 3 1; 1988, ch. 248, 3 31; 1991, ch. 268,
3 31.
Amended effective January 1, 1992. —
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 31 amends this section
effective January 1,1992. See amendment note
below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, deleted the subsection designation (1) at the beginning of the

section; substituted the subsection designations (1) to (6) for former subsection designations (l)(a) to (1X0; deleted former Subsection
(2) which read T h e circuit court shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the
peace courts where the sum claimed is less
than $750"; and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
1992, substituted "$20,000" for "$10,000" in
the introductory language.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arbitration.
Title to real estate.
Arbitration.
The Utah Arbitration Act creates a statutory
remedy for judicial enforcement, modification,
or vacation of an arbitration award, and specifically provides that the remedy will be implemented by proceedings in the district courts of
this state. A circuit court cannot have subject
matter jurisdiction under the Utah Arbitration

Act, notwithstanding this section. Transworld
Sys. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Title to real estate.
An order of the circuit court purporting to
adjudicate ownership rights to real property
and the proceeds of its sale was null and void.
A circuit court could not, through consent or
waiver, expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims involving the title to real property.
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).

78-4-7.5. Trials de novo.
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo of the
judgments of the justices* courts and trials de novo of the small claims department of the circuit court.
History? C 1953. 78-4-7.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, 5 66; 1988, ch. 73, § 2; 1988, ch.
248, 3 32.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25,1988, rewrote the section which read "The
circuit court has jurisdiction to hear trials de
novo of the judgments of the justices' courts."

The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25. 1988, inserted "appellate" before "jurisdiction."
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

78-4-8. Venue and change of judge provisions — Exceptions [Repealed effective January 1, 1992].
Provisions of law regarding venue and change of judge apply to the circuit
courts the same as district courts, except cases arising under or by reason of
the violation of municipal ordinances may, upon stipulation of the parties or
upon order of the court for good cause shown, be tried and decided in a municipality or county within the circuit other than the municipality or county in
which the violation occurred.
83

Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted «by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

fice of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1/' into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1992].
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
0") cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
11
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78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force,
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-1.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Burglary and criminal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages.
—Mental anguish.
—Nominal.
Forcible detainer distinguished.
Landlord and tenant.
—Contract rights.
—Motel operator and occupant.
Unlawful eviction.
Policy of section.
—Abolishment of common-law.
Purpose of provisions.
—Preventing disturbances of peace.
—Summary remedy.
Rent.
Separate tort action.
What constitutes forcible entry.
—Removal of doors.
Damages.
—Mental a n g u i s h .
Tenant who is wrongfully evicted can collect
damages for mental anguish and humiliation.
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a
wrong which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a cause of action is a proper
element of damages where it is a natural and
proximate consequence of the wrong. Lambert
v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 (1953).
—Nominal.
The statute places a duty upon any person,
whether entitled to possession or not, not to
use force or stealth or fraud in gaining possession of realty. Correspondingly, it creates a
right in the person in actual peaceable possession not to have his possession disturbed other
than by legal process. Therefore, regardless of
his lack of entitlement to the property, the tenant has a cause of action for the invasion of
t h a t right. Where no actual damages are
proved he should be awarded nominal damages
to preserve the right. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d
419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).

Forcible detainer distinguished.
Forcible entry and forcible detainer, while
often spoken of together, are in fact separate
and distinct wrongs. Buchanan v. Crites, 106
Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Landlord and tenant.
—Contract rights.
Anyone committing acts specifically prohibited under this section would be guilty of forcible entry including a party who may by contract be authorized to enter or an owner who as
a matter of law may have a right to possession;
contract purporting to establish right of reentry for default of rent payments did not give
landlord right to remove employee of tenants
from office and change locks on all doors. Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Whsle.
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969).
—Motel o p e r a t o r a n d o c c u p a n t .
Unlawful eviction.
Where evidence disclosed t h a t relationship
between operators of a motel and the occupants
of an apartment therein was one of landlord
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and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and
guest, the occupants could only be dispossessed
of the apartment by resort to the statutory
remedy of unlawful detainer. When the owner
of the motel locked out the occupants for
unpaid rent, there was an unlawful eviction.
Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241
(1953).
Policy of section.
—Abolishment of common-law.
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy
that no person should enter by force, stealth,
fraud or intimidation, premises of which another had peaceable possession. This had the
effect of taking away the common-law right of
a landlord to possess his own property by no
more force than was necessary and left the one
against whom force was used to pursue his
common-law action. Buchanan v. Crites, 106
Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Purpose of provisions.
—Preventing disturbances of peace.
The forcible entry and detainer statute was
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing
disturbances of the peace brought about
through self-help in the matter of dispossession. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d
1114 (1955).
—Summary remedy.
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy
remedy, summary in character, to obtain possession of real property. Paxton v. Fisher, 86
Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935).

78-36-2

Rent
This chapter provides a summary remedy for
the recovery of real property in case of forcible
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer
thereof. That is the purpose of the chapter, and
not to deal with the subject of remedies for
rent. The question of rent is drawn into the
statute, not for the purpose of providing a remedy for its recovery, but to complete a case of
unlawful detainer, which is the gist of the action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913
(1930).
Separate tort action.
A landlord who is entitled to possession
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender
the premises, resort to the remedy given by
law to secure it. A violation of that duty set by
the statute gives rise to an action for damages,
not in an action under the forcible entry and
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v.
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).
What constitutes forcible entry.
—Removal of doors.
Where defendant landlord entered upon the
premises in plaintiffs absence by unlocking
the doors and removing the doors from their
hinges and carrying them away, the weather
being at the time freezing, these facts were
held to sufficiently show a forcible entry. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Landlord-Tenant
Law: A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 727, 738.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.

C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 1, 2.
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «= 4.

78-36-2, "Forcible detainer" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlawful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-2.

Cross-References. — Burglary and criminal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consent to entry.
—Evidence.
—Failure of action.
Issues.
—Immediate right of possession.
Liability.
—Lessor.
—Purchaser.
Occupancy "within five days."
—Allegation.
"Unlawfully enters."
Consent to entry.
—Evidence.
To show intention of parties and acquiescence by plaintiff in defendant's possession, escrow agreement and quitclaim deed executed
by plaintiff were held to be properly admitted
in evidence. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).
—Failure of action.
As one of the elements of this action is the
unlawful entry, the action must fail if it is
found that defendant entered with consent of
plaintiff. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, 141
P.2d 880 (1943).
Issues.
—Immediate right of possession.
In action of forcible entry and detainer, the
only question involved is the immediate right
to possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).
Liability.
—Lessor.
Where, without serving the three days' notice required by § 78-36-3(3), a lessor entered
the premises of his tenant, whose rent was two
months in arrears, changed the locks on the
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter
to remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of the personal property on the premises.
Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507
(1965).

—Purchaser.
Where purchaser of state land took possession of land while lessee from state was away
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since
such purchaser should have made proper demand, and if it was refused, should have settled question of possession by law. Paxton v.
Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Fact that one of defendants in forcible detainer action by lessee of state land had signed
purchase contract covering such land would
not, in itself, make him personally liable. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935);
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d
100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Occupancy "within five days."
—Allegation.
Allegation of "more" than five days includes
period of "within" five days. Woodbury v.
Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940);
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102
Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943).
"Unlawfully enters."
'Unlawfully enters" in Subsection (2) means
unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was
there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker,
98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v.
Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).
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CHAPTER 35
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
Section
78-35-5.

Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant.

78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant
If the defendant attempts to evade the service of the writ of habeas corpus,
or if the defendant or any officer willfully fails to comply with the legal duties
imposed upon him, or if he disobeys the order of discharge, he is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor, and shall also forfeit to the person aggrieved not more
than $5,000. Any person knowingly aiding in or abetting invalidation of this
section is subject to the same punishment and forfeiture.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-5; L. 1986, ch. 178, § 66; 1991,
ch. 241, § 107.

Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class B" for "class A" in the first sentence.

CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-3.

Unlawful detainer by tenant for
term less than life.

78-36-3- Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
lifeCD A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
233
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in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent
becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three
days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards
be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined
under Chapter 16, Title 57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp,, 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 1; 1986,
ch. 137, § 1; 1989, ch. 101, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend
ment, effective Apnl 24, 1989, inserted the
subsection designation (1) at the beginning of
the section, designated former Subsections (1)

and (2) as Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b), designated former Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as
Subsection (l)(b)(i) and Subsection (l)(b)(ii),
designated former Subsections (3) to (5) as Subsections (l)(c) to (l)(e), added Subsection (2),
a n d m a d e m m o r s t yh s tic changes

78-36-10- J u d g m e n t for restitution, damages, and rent —
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Damages.
—Treble damages.
In accord with first paragraph in bound vol-

ume See Monroe, Inc v Sidwell, 770 ?M
1022 (Utah Ct App 1989)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Air-conditioning appliance, equipment, or apparatus as fixture, 69 A L R 4th
359.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 1, 2.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer *=» 5,

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life(/
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(1) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(2) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(a) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(b) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(3) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(4) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three
days' notice to quit; or
(5) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice the tenant, or any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance, may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture except that if the cove535
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nants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards
be performed, then no notice need be given.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 1; 1986,
ch. 137, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment substituted "three days" for "five days" in

the first sentence of Subsection (5) and made
stylistic changes throughout the section
Cross-References. — Nuisances, Title 47
Right to recover treble damages from tenants committing waste, § 78-38-2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cause of action
—Default in rent
—Prerequisites
—Presumptions
—When determined
—When exists
Federal regulations
—Modification of state remedies
Notice to quit
—Administrative claim
—Liability of tenant
—Prerequisites
—Sufficiency
—Tenancy at will
Persons liable
Pleadings
—Tenancy at will
Right of re-entry
—Contractual provisions
Strict performance
—Waiver
Strict statutory compliance
—Not required
—Required
Termination of lease
Treble damages
—Contract of sale
—Intervenor
—Lease
Cause of action.
—Default in rent.
No cause of action for unlawful detainer
based on default in payment of rent survived
where tenant tendered rent due within three
days after service of unlawful detainer action,
regardless of defects in such notice Dang v
Cox Corp, 655 P 2d 658 (Utah 1982)
—Prerequisites.
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to
cause of action Carstensen v Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 152 P 2d 954 (1944)
—Presumptions.
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence of fraud and force, as well as existence of

relation of landlord and tenant Holladay Coal
Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P 882 (1899)
—When determined.
Whether a cause of action exists under this
section is to be determined at the time the action is commenced Van Zyverden v Farrar, 15
Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 468 (1964)
—When exists.
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant
is subject to ouster by an unlawful detainer
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursuant to this section Woodbury v Bunker, 98
Utah 216, 98 P 2d 948 (1940), American Mut
Bldg & Loan Co v Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117
P 2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah
328, 133 P2d 332 (1943)
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Unless tenant has retained the right to
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry
of premises for t h a t purpose constitutes unlawful detainer. Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415,
154 P.2d 642 (1944).
Federal r e g u l a t i o n s .
—Modification of s t a t e r e m e d i e s .
OPA rental and housing regulations, under
Federal Price Control Act, were binding upon
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to
extent t h a t such remedy was in conflict with
that act. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,
196 P.2d 714 (1948).
Notice to quit.
—Administrative claim.
Notice to quit or pay rent served on government as required by this section was not an
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and federal court therefore
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer action brought under Federal Tort
Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977).
—Liability of t e n a n t
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to
vacate premises did not terminate provision
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where
parties entered stipulation, while matter was
pending, t h a t lessee considered lease in effect
and held under it after end of fixed term. Milliner v. Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d 151
(1970).
—Prerequisites.
Notice in accordance with Subsection (5)
should precede notice to quit, and must be uncomplied with for five days after the service
before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974).
—Sufficiency.
A notice to quit is sufficient under subsection
'2) in the case of a tenancy a t will, as provided
in contract of sale in case of default, where it
merely declares a forfeiture, and is not insufficient under subsection (5) because not giving
purchasers alternative of performing conditions of the agreement. Forrester v. Cook, 77
Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d
592 (1970).
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had
failed to make payments of rent due under
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further providing that tenants were to quit premises and deliver up possession to landlord
within fifteen days did not comply with statutory requirements under this section; in absence of compliance, landlord was not entitled
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to maintain action for restitution of premises.
American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970).
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to terminate a lease for breach of covenant, is not sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer; the
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e.,
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes
subject to the provisions of this chapter.
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.,
558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and lessor was not entitled to maintain an action under this section where lessor's notice to vacate
premises was defective in that it did not state
that lessee had the alternative of paying the
delinquent rent or surrendering the premises.
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah
1979).
The critical distinction between a notice of
unlawful detainer and a notice of forfeiture is
that the notice of forfeiture simply declares a
termination of the lease without giving the lessee the alternative of making up the deficiency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah
1982).
A notice to a month-to-month t e n a n t to quit
the premises need not contain the alternative
of paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1981).
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy by conducting certain businesses on
premises, and which plainly informed tenant
that he must desist from such objectionable
practices by certain date and that, if on or before t h a t date he failed to desist therefrom and
had not surrendered premises, action would be
commenced for restitution of premises, was not
defective because notice was not expressed in
the alternative as required by subsection (5) of
former § 104-60-3, i.e., t h a t violation must
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was
plain intent of notice without use of word "or."
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d
714 (1948).
— T e n a n c y a t will.
It is only after buyer is in the status of a
tenant a t will t h a t he is amenable to the notice
provided by this section, which requires him to
vacate within five days or be guilty of an unlawful detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15
Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).
At common law a tenant a t will was not entitled to notice to quit possession. Buchanan v.
Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).
Where lease was terminated by failure of
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant became a tenant at will and landlord properly
proceeded to regain possession by the proce-
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dure set forth in subsection (2) by giving notice
to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invs., 14 Utah
2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963).
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant
at will for failure to make payment was sufficient under subsection (5) even though several
months had elapsed between first and final notice. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24
Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (1970).

possession of the premises. A t e n a n t is guilty of
unlawful detainer when he continues in possession after default in payment of any r e n t
and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises, etc. Commercial Block
Realty Co. v. Merchants* Protective Ass'n 71
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928).

P e r s o n s liable.
No one but tenant of real property for term
less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer. Hoiladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah
192, 57 P. 882 (1899).

—Required.
This section, which provides a severe remedy, must be strictly complied with before the
cause of action thereon may be maintained.
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367 393
P.2d 468 (1964).

Pleadings.
—Tenancy at will.
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner
could recover property on fifteen-day notice, allegation in complaint t h a t such tenant had violated substantial obligations of rental agreement was not necessary in unlawful detainer
action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196
P.2d 714 (1948).
Right of re-entry.
—Contractual provisions.
Under contract for sale and exchange of real
estate, providing that seller at his option could
re-enter premises and be released from his obligations upon default of buyer, seller was
bound to give buyer notice of his intention to
take advantage of forfeiture provision of contract, since such provision was not self-executing. Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699,
94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934).
Strict performance.
—Waiver.
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's pastdue payments under uniform real estate contract, and other conduct leading latter to believe that strict performance would not be required by vendor, imposes duty on vendor to
give purchaser reasonable notice before vendor
may insist on strict performance by purchaser.
Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195
P.2d 748 (1948).
Strict statutory c o m p l i a n c e .
—Not required.
There is no reason for the strict rule that
landlord must demand the precise or exact
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover

Termination of lease.
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982).
Treble damages.
— C o n t r a c t of sale.
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of
sale of real estate, where the vendors gave notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up
or quit, as is required under this section, the
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961).
—Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
—Lease.
Under a lease contract for a period of years,
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was not
sufficient for treble damages. Under such a
lease the statutes require an alternative notice
that the tenant either perform or quit before he
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954), distinguished, Jensen
v. Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96,485 P.2d 673 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. J u r . 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1115 et seq.; 50 Am. J u r . 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 1205 et seq.

C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 758.
A.L.R. — Right of landlord legally entitled
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to possession to dispossess tenant without legal
process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177.
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation
of covenant in lease or provision of statute
against assigning or subletting without lessor's
consent, 71 A.L.R.3d 780.

/o-ou-u

Express or implied restriction on lessee's use
of residential property for business purposes,
46 A.L.R.4th 496.
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=»
290

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding
over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the
part of the tenant to hold for another year.
History: L. 1951, ch. 5S, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-4; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1193.
C.J.S. — 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 136(3).

Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant <s=»
114(3).

78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant § 506.
C.J.S. — 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 48(1) et seq.

Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant <s=
80(3).

78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
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either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place (
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the plao
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the lease
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manne
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-6; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 3; 1986,
ch. 137, § 2; 1987, ch. 123, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment deleted the comma at the end of Subsection (3) and deleted "and also delivering a copy
to a person there residing, if the person can be
found, and also sending a copy through the
mail addressed to the tenant at the place
where the leased property is situated" at the
end of the first sentence in Subsection (4).
The 1987 amendment deleted "either" and a

comma following "may be served" in the intr
ductory language; substituted "a person" f<
"some person" and "mailing a copy" for "sem
ing a copy through the mail addressed" an
inserted "the address of" in Subsection (3); an
deleted "the place of residence of business cai
not be ascertained or" preceding "a person" an
substituted "at the place of residence" f(
"there" in the first sentence of Subsection (4
Cross-References. — Service of proce*
Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Death of landlord.
—Substitution of parties.
Delay in bringing action.
Improper service.
—Failure to' mail.
Leaving copy with spouse.
—Failure to personally serve.
Mail.
Rules of Civil Procedure.
—Effect.
Strict statutory compliance.
Death of landlord.

Improper service.

—Substitution of p a r t i e s .
Notice served by agent of landlord during his
lifetime did not lose its force upon landlord's
death in view of C.L. 1917, § 6513 permitting
substitution of personal representative for deceased, nor was executor under necessity of
serving another demand for possession before
bringing action, for he was entitled to carry on
the litigation from point where original party
left it. Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7
(1930).

— Failure to mail.

Delay in bringing a c t i o n .
Mere lapse of time does not operate as an
abandonment of all claim and demand under
the notice; nor does mere delay in bringing
suit, where explained, render demand for possession of the premises of no force or effect.
Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7
(1930), an action in which six years elapsed
between demand for possession on commencement of action and in which there were delays
in bringing suit to trial.

Leaving copy with s p o u s e .
An action for unlawful detainer cannot bt
maintained against a tenant to whom no cop:
of the notice required by the statute wa:
mailed, although a copy was left with his wife
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2<
446 (1952).
—Failure to personally s e r v e .
Mail.
Assuming that compliance with this sectioi
can be waived by defendant tenant, enterin
general appearance cannot have that effect. 1
was not a compliance with statute for landlorc
after failing in a few attempts to find tenant
a t home and serve them personally with notice
to mail a copy of notice to quit, addressed t<
them at their place of residence. Carstensen v
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944
(decided under prior law).
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Rules of Civil Procedure.
—Effect.
The general provisions of Rule 4, U.R.C.P.,
relating to service do not modify the provisions
of this section, which specifically applies to service in unlawful detainer actions. Ute-Cal
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
Strict statutory compliance.
To hold that any method of service other
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than that prescribed in the statute is sufficient
to comply with it would be to nullify the intention of the legislature. Carstensen v. Hansen,
107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944).
Unlawful detainer being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly complied
with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468,
243 P.2d 446 (1954), distinguished, Jensen v.
Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d,Landlord
and Tenant § 1213.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 769(1) et seq.

Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=*
283.

78-36-7- Necessary parties defendant.
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any proceeding
abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the
parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment must be rendered against them. In case a person has become subtenant
of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice in this chapter
provided for, the fact that such notice was not served on such subtenant shall
constitute no defense to the action. All persons who enter under the tenant
after the commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-7.
Cross-References. — Necessary joinder of
parties, Rule 19, U.R.C.P.

Nonsuit, dismissal of actions, Rule 41,
U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability of parties.
—Intervenor.
Necessary parties.
—Agent of landlord.
—Assignor of sales contract.
Liability of parties.
—Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for

treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
Necessary parties.
—Agent of landlord.
Agent of landlord is not a necessary or
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proper party in forcible detainer proceeding,
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982
(1926).
—Assignor of sales contract
It was not necessary for assignee of seller's
interest in real estate sale contract to notify
original purchaser of the forfeiture for default

or make him a defendant in the unlawful detainer action since an action for unlawful detainer is primarily against the person in possession and it is not necessary for everyone
having an interest to be made a party. Pearce
v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P.2d 442 (1954)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1236.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 764.

Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=
291(6).

78-36-8- Allegations permitted in complaint — Time foi
appearance — Service of summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on whict
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or vio
lence which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible o
unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the occu
pation of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer charged is aftei
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount of rem
due. The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within whicl
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not b<
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court ma}
authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is complete three
days after mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to th<
time of service as ordered, and shall be served as in other cases.
History: L. 1951, ch, 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-8; 1987, ch. 123 § 2.
filed
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "rent due" for "such rent" at
the end of the second sentence; deleted except
when publication is necessarv, in which case
the court shall direct publication for a period of
not less than one week" from the end of the
third sentence; added the present fourth, fifth,
and sixth sentences; deleted the former last

sentence, which read 'The complaint shall b
within one day after service of summons
ifnot served therewith"; and made minor phra
seol
a n d p u n c t u a t i o n changes throughou
^ f
d and third sentences
^
' *
^
x t
Cross-References — General rules c
pleadings, Rule 8, U.R.C.P.
Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action to recover rent.
Damages.
—Right to demand.
Dismissal.
—Joint motion.
Necessary allegations and proof.
—Date of notice to surrender.
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Action to recover rent
Plaintiff may bring action to recover rent
due, and a separate action in unlawful detainer
for recovery of possession and for damages.
Judgment in one action will not bar action in
the other proceeding, the issues in the two actions not being the same, and, therefore, not
being adjudicated. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah
171, 292 P. 913 (1930).
Damages.
—Right to demand.
The plaintiff in his complaint may not only
ask for possession of the premises, but also for
damages accruing to trial. Forrester v. Cook,
77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
Dismissal.
—Joint motion.
Where complaint in forcible entry and detainer action stated cause of action against one
defendant, joint demurrer (now motion to dismiss) by two defendants was properly overruled. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d
903 (1935).
Necessary allegations and proof.
Plaintiff must allege and prove, not only that
he has right to property's possession, but also
that property is being unlawfully detained
from him, after notice to quit, served as provided by law. Barnes v. Cox, 12 Utah 47, 41 P.
557 (1895).

78-36-8.5

As a rule, all that is required to be alleged by
plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, is facts and circumstances constituting
entry or detainer complained of, and either
that he was peaceably in actual possession of
premises at time of forcible entry, or, in some
cases, that he was entitled to possession of
premises at time of forcible detainer. Holladay
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882
(1899).
Plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, need not allege his estate in or title to
premises, nor, with few exceptions, is he required to allege his right of possession.
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57
P. 882 (1899).
—Date of notice to surrender.
In action of forcible entry and detainer, held
that exact date on which notice to surrender
premises was given was wholly immaterial,
and that plaintiff was only required to aver
and prove specific fact that, subsequent to time
of unlawful entry, while defendants were in
possession and prior to commencement of action, sufficient notice was given and that surrender of premises by defendants was refused
for period of three days thereafter. Holladay
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882
(1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 38 et seq.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 39, 42, 44.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «= 24.

78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in
the same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all
of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1):
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(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as
provided in the rental agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court.
The defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession
bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable
amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintifi
if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be helc
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is serve*
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsec
tion (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff o
the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the prop
erty to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if th<
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of th
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the prof
erty to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remai
in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the partie
the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsectic
(2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties ca
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjud
eating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-8.5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 4; L. 1983, ch. 209, § 1; 1987,
ch. 123, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote this section to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable.

Cross-References. — Contracts of sure!
ship, § 31A-22-101 et seq.
County sheriff, Chapter 22 of Title 17.
Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.CJ

78-36-9, Proof required by plaintiff — DefenseOn the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer t
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possess!
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time
the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or i
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in *
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously n(
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before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-9.

Cross-References. — Limitation of actions,
real property, § 78-12-2 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Defenses and counterclaims.
—Tenant.
Counterclaim.
—Tender of rent.
Possession.
—Constructive.
Right of entry.
—Public land.
Security interest in personal property.
—Partial possession of premises.
Title adjudication.
—Color of title.
State lease.
—Deed.
Fraud and duress.
—Tax title.
Defenses and counterclaims.
—Tenant
Counterclaim.
Defendant in forcible detainer action cannot
file counterclaim, and is limited to defenses
predicated on nonexistence of relationship of
landlord and tenant between parties, nonexistence of valid lease or contract to pay rent, or
that no rent is due; but he may bring suit in
court of equity to determine rights and enjoin
forcible detainer proceeding pending such determination. Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398,
250 P. 982 (1926) (decided under prior law).
Under Rule 13, U.R.C.P., counterclaim alleging misrepresentation and fraud concerning
the contract of purchase of the involved property could be asserted by defendants in an unlawful detainer action. White v. District Court,
232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951).
—Tender of r e n t
A tender by tenant of rent, if insufficient in
amount, is no tender at all, and the fact that
subsequent tenders were, in the aggregate,
equivalent to the rent due, will not make the
tender sufficient and valid. Commercial Block
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928).
Possession.
—Constructive.
Right of entry.
Under an allegation of possession plaintiff

can show constructive possession, in that it is
an association of qualified persons in possession of coal mines upon which sufficient money
has been expended to give a preference right of
entry to 640 acres of surrounding land under
the law. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah
192, 57 P. 882 (1899).
—Public land.
Possession of public land is prima facie evidence of right to possession as against a mere
intruder or trespasser. Wilson v. Triumph
Consol. Mining Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 P. 300, 75
Am. St. R. 718 (1899).
Security interest in personal property.
—Partial possession of premises.
Plaintiffs security interest in bar equipment
did not constitute partial possession of premises, and plaintiff could not maintain action for
forcible entry or for wrongful eviction.
Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 P.2d 194 (Utah
1975).
Title adjudication.
In action for possession and damages for unlawful detention of farm lands, trial court
erred in rendering judgment and decree in defendant's favor quieting title to premises, since
question of title is not ordinarily involved in
such actions. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240,
173 P. 245 (1918).
It is not proper to quiet title to real estate in
action of forcible entry or in action for unlaw-
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ful detainer. Thomson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah
437, 174 P. 164 (1918).
Color of title.

tainer proceedings to try title or equities between parties, so that, in such an action, defen^ a n t w a s n o t permitted to show that deed executed by him to plaintiff was obtained from
him by means of fraud and duress since such

-—ota. e ease.
In suit for foible entry .t was proper to d e f e n s e woM c o n s t i t u t e a n a t t e t to d i
introduce lease from State Land Board (now . ,. ,, .... „,.„.
„ /
««- Tr. ,
Board of State Lands) to plaintiffs to show that ! ^ d 1 ^ ' ^ % ^ " i ^ V*
'
^
they held under color of title and that it was 304 > l61 *' n i ( 1 9 2 5 ) '
necessary for defendants to resort to statute to
Tax title
S l f ^ f S o T L°iV ™ ? V' D e a r d o n ' 9 4 U t a h " Affirmative defense and counterclaim set149, 76 P.2d 561 (1938).
U n g u p tflX t i U e a n d s e e k i n g to h a v e p r o p € r t v
—Deed.
in question quieted in defendant, held not to lie
m
Fraud and duress.
f°rcible detainer action. Woodbury v.
It is not intention of forcible entry and de- Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer §§ 42 to 44.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 53 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «=» 29.

78-36-10, Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent —
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution
of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the Tease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon
the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in
the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced
immediately.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-10; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 5; 1987,
ch. 123, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided the section into subsections; di-

vided the former first sentence into the present
second and third sentences of Subsection (1) by
deleting "and" and making a related punctuation change; added the present first sentence of
Subsection (1); rewrote the second sentence of
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Subsection (1); inserted "or upon the defendant's default", substituted "resulting" for "occasioned" and "from any of the following" for
"by any" and made punctuation changes in
Subsection (2); deleted "or by any" and made a
punctuation change in Subsection (2)(a); deleted "and any amount found due the plaintiff
by reason o f and made a punctuation change
in Subsection (2)(b); substituted "during the
defendant's tenancy, if waste is" for "by the
defendant during the tenancy," and "at trial;
and" for "on the trial, and find" in Subsection
(2)(c); deleted "any" preceding "rent due" and
"and" from the end, and made a punctuation
change in Subsection (l)(d); substituted "entered" for "rendered", a comma for "and" following "for the rent", and the language begin-

78-36-10

ning "assessed under Subsections (2)(a)" for
"thus assessed" and deleted "guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer,"
following "against the defendant" in Subsection (3)"; substituted "If for "When" at the
beginning of Subsection (4); deleted "an" preceding "unlawful detainer" and "execution
upon the judgment shall be issued immediately
after the entry of the judgement" plus a comma
following "payment of the rent" in the first
sentence of Subsection (4); and inserted "issued
and" and made a punctuation change in the
second sentence of Subsection (4).
Cross-References. — Fees of constable,
§ 21-3-3.
Fees of sheriff, § 21-2-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages
—Loss of value.
—Nominal damages.
—Rent and profits.
—Treble damages.
Execution upon judgment.
—Failure to pay rent.
Grace period.
—Attempt to use.
Real estate sale contracts.
—Liquidated damages.
Separate action for rent.
Statutory remedy.
—Tort liability for noncompliance.
Damages.
—Loss of value.
The loss of the value of the use and occupation of the premises, during the period when
the premises were unlawfully withheld from
plaintiff, is "damage" suffered. Forrester v.
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
—Nominal damages.
Where husband and wife occupy the premises, and the notice required by statute is
served only on the wife so that an action for
unlawful detainer can be maintained merely
against her, the successful plaintiff is entitled
to nominal damages only, since, even if the
wife had moved, the plaintiff would have had
no right to possession of the premises as
against the husband, and he thus suffered no
actual damage by reason of the fact that the
wife remained there. Perkins v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), distinguished,
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d
989 (1958).

—Rent and profits.
Damages recoverable must be the natural
and proximate consequences of the unlawful
detainer and nothing more. Rents and profits,
or rental value of the premises, during detention are included in damages. Rental value or
reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises becomes an element of damages
for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is
damages. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292
P. 206 (1930).
This section was not designed to provide a
summary remedy for the recovery of rent. The
language thereof that "judgment shall be rendered ...for the rent," etc., is applicable only
when rent is claimed in the complaint for it
would be improper in any case to award a judgment for what is not so claimed. Voyles v.
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913 (1930).
—Treble damages.
After the termination of the tenancy by notice to quit, the person in unlawful possession
is not owing rent under contract, but must respond in damages. This is not rent, but "dam-
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ages," and, therefore, may be trebled. Forrester
v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
Where all issues were decided in plaintiffs
favor, trial court's refusal to treble damages,
awarded plaintiff by jury, was error. Eccles v.
Union Pac. Coal Co., 15 Utah 14, 48 P. 148
(1897).
Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provisions of § 78-36-8 converted his action for unlawful detainer into one at common law for
ejectment and defeated his right under this
section to treble damages. Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317. (Utah
1976).
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
Where tenant merely remains over upon termination of lease and increase in rent, but does
not contest landlord's right to terminate lease
or his right to possession, tenant is conclusively presumed to have acquiesced in increased rental and landlord is not entitled to
treble damages. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251
P. 1073 (1926).
The provision for treble damages is highly
penal, and, therefore, subject to strict construction. It will be observed that only damages are
to be trebled, not rents and waste. But the language is mandatory making it compulsory
upon the court to render and enter judgment
for three times the amount of the damages assessed, after a finding of damages by the jury.
And rents which may not be trebled are such
as accrue before termination of the tenancy.
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206
(1930).
Execution u p o n judgment.
—Failure to pay rent.
When landlord prevails in unlawful detainer
action because of tenant's failure to pay rent
under a lease which has not expired, he cannot
have any judgment unless he shows that there
is rent due and the amount thereof; when that
is done, the tenant has five days in which to
pay the judgment and costs, and then he will
be restored to the premises under his lease.
The landlord cannot prevent the tenant from
paying the judgment and regaining his rights

under the unexpired lease by the device of failing to have the amount of rent due included in
the judgment In such a case unless the judgment determines the amount of rent due, it is
defective, and the restitution part cannot be
lawfully enforced. Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40
(1972).
Grace period.
—Attempt to use.
Where evicted lessees asserted that they
were not afforded the five-day post-judgment
grace period to pay the delinquency and preserve the lease, the issue was moot since the
defendants did not make an attempt to take
advantage of the grace period. Allred v. Smith,
674 P.2d 99 (Utah 1983) (decided under facts
existing prior to 1981 amendment).
Real estate sale contracts.
—Liquidated damages.
By common practice in Utah, an action in
unlawful detainer may be brought against a
vendee of realty whose payments are far in arrears, after sufficient demands for payment
have been made and subsequent notice to quit
has been given by vendor; where a vendor does
cancel the contract for sale and bring such an
action, vendee may be required, if the contract
so provides, to forfeit as liquidated damages all
money theretofore paid to the vendor along
with all improvements placed on the land by
the vendee, unless such forfeiture would be unconscionable. Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d
278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
Separate action for rent.
Judgment in unlawful detainer for restitution of the premises and for treble damages
does not bar action to recover rent due, rent not
being claimed or adjudged in the possessory
action, because the right to recover possession
by summary remedy, and the claim for rent, do
not constitute one entire and indivisible cause
of action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P.
913 (1930).
Statutory remedy.
—Tort liability for noncompliance.
A landlord who is entitled to possession
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender
the premises, resort to the remedy given by
law to secure it. A violation of that dujty set by
the statute gives rise to an action for damages,
not in an action under the forcible entry and
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v.
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Forfeiture Under Installment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981 Utah
L. Rev. 803, 807.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 53.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 68 et seq.

A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at
higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer «=» 38.

78-36-11. Time for appeals, appeal from the judgment rendered.
Either party may, within ten days,
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-11.

Cross-References. — Stay of execution
pending appeal, Rule 62, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
—Held applicable.
—Held inapplicable.
Failure to comply.
—Loss of jurisdiction.
Applicability of section.
—Held applicable.
Fact that demurrer to complaint required
trial court to construe written instrument to
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to
any relief did not change action from one of
unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to
take appeal within ten days as provided by this
section. Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247,
129 P.2d 986 (1942).
Appeal from dismissal of unlawful detainer
action for failure to amend complaint within
time allowed was governed by this section.
Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 129 P.2d
986 (1942).
Time for taking appeal in forcible entry and
detainer suit was governed by this section,
which is valid, and general provision providing
for appeals was not applicable. Hunsaker v.
Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 (1910).
A party had ten days, as provided by this
section, and not one month, as provided by former Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P., in which to appeal
from a judgment for unlawful detainer. UteCal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch.,
628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
Fact that judgment rested on construction of
whether lease was terminated upon sale of
property did not change action from one in unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to
take appeal within ten days as provided by this

section. Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92
P.2d 338 (1939).
—Held inapplicable.
Where a complaint contained two causes of
action asking for treble damages for forcible
entry and detainer, one cause of action for a
temporary restraining order and temporary injunction, and a fourth cause of action for damages for breach of a lease; the hybrid nature of
the plaintiffs action prevented this statute
from controlling the time limitation for filing
an appeal. Fashions Four v. Fashion Place
Assocs., 681 P.2d 830 (Utah 1984).
Where plaintiff in forcible detainer action
was held liable on counterclaim, time for appeal was not governed by ten-day limitation of
this section, but by general six-month statute,
ten-day limit of this section being applicable
only to judgments in forcible detainer. Dunbar
v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926).
Ten-day period for appeal provided in forcible entry and detainer cases was inapplicable
to appeal from money judgment entered for
landlord after recovery of possession, sixmonth period of general statute being applicable. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P. 1073
(1926).
Where, in first count, plaintiff sought to recover possession of real estate, and in second
count sought to quiet title to certain land adjoining property involved in first cause of action, and it appeared that case was tried as
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action in equity, plaintiff could not defeat appeal by contending that action was one of forcible detainer. Ottenheimer v. Mountain States
Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117 (1920).
Failure to comply.
—Loss of jurisdiction.
Where judgment was entered against appel-

lants on July 1 and they did not file notice of
appeal until July 15, appeal was not timely
filed and Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to hear it. Coombs v. Johnson, 26 Utah 2d
8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 55.
C.J.S. — 36A CJ.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 90.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer <fc* 43.

78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting
to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 6.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at

78-36-12.3-

higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.

Definitions.

(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence
of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
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History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 7.

78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value
and the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a)
notwithstanding that the owner did not re-rent the premises.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from
the tenant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage
for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it,
the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount
the tenant owes. Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be
handled as specified in § 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this act shall be in
derogation of or alter the owner's rights under Chapter 3, Title 38.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 8; 1986, ch. 194, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment moved the Subsection (1) designation to
the beginning of the section and made minor
word and stylistic changes; and in Subsection
(2) substituted «§ 78-44-18" for «§ 78-44-11"
and made minor word and stylistic changes.

Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws
1981, Chapter 160, which appears as
§§ 78-36-3, 78-36-4, 78-36-6, 78-36-8.5,
78-36-10, 78-36-12 and 78-36-12.3.
Cross-References. — Residential renters'
^ C h ter 1 7 o f T i t l e 5 7
d

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at

higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.
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Rule 6- Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays- and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of th -*
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
Compiler's Notes. — Tins rule is substantially similar to Rule 6, F R C P
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision
(b), was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of
the Appellate Procedure
Cross-References. — Amendment to pleadings to conform to evidence, time of motion for,
Rule 15(b)
Commencement of action, time of service,
Rule 4(b)
Corporation or association, mailing of process to, Rule 4(e)(5).

Depositions, objections to errors and irregularities, Rule 32(d).
Discharge of attachment or release of property, Rule 64C(f)
Documents for state or subdivision, filing
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3
Election laws, Sundays included in computation of time, § 20-1-12
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge,
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13
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Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is
added to the list of those rules that the appellate court may not suspend. The former list of
rules that the appellate court could not suapend concerned procedures and time limits
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial

court. If the motions are not filed in a timely
manner, the appellant may not take advantage
of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the disposition of the motion to file the appeal. Both
appellate courts treat the failure to file postjudgment motions in a timely manner as a jurisdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Timely filing.
When a motion for summary disposition was
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen-

sion of the time limitation contained in Rule
10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d
1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
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party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(0 Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
Advisory Committee Note. — The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal appellate
courts.
The rule is amended to make clear that the
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appear does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the

order of filing, the cross-appellant would have
been the appellant and so should be required to
pay the established fees.
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, appeals from, § 78-4-11.
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120.
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of record.
Attorney fees.
Denial of intervention.
Dismissal by trial court.
Piling fees.
Piling of notice.
Final order or judgment.
Judgment nunc pro tunc.
Motion to strike.
New trial.
Partial judgment.
Postjudgment orders.
Purpose of notice.
Review in equity cases.
Summary judgment.
Unsigned minute entry.
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following
annotations are taken from cases decided under former Rule 3, R. Utah S. Ct.
Absence of record.
There was nothing for the court to review
where the alleged error was not made part of
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977).
Attorney fees.
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees

by law, he was entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
without the necessity of having to file a cross
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co.,
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallia v. Thomas,
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Denial of intervention.
Order denying with prejudice an application
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
1980).
Dismissal by trial court.
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on
the merits of the issues under Rule 41(b),
U.R.C.P., and an order of dismissal without
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P., are
final abjudications of the issues and the time
for appeal under this rule begins to run with
the entry of the order. Steiner v. State, 27 Utah
2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972).
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was
not afinaljudgment subject to appeal. Little v.
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs action was appealable where the trial court's ruling went to the legal merits of any cause that
plaintiff may have framed. Bowles v. State ex
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rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345
(Utah 1982).
Filing fees.
It is not the clerk's duty to file notice of appeal until he has received the appropriate filing fee. McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431
P.2d 571 (1967).
Where the notice of appeal was left at the
clerk's office prior to the expiration of the time
for filing but the filing fee was not paid until
after expiration of the time for filing and the
clerk did not file the notice until the fee was
paid, the notice was untimely filed and the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d
571 (1967).
Filing of notice.
Where the deadline for filing an appeal expired on Saturday, the notice of appeal which
was filed on the following Monday was within
the time limit, in view of the provisions of
S 17-16-9. Transwe8tern Gen. Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974).
Without notice of appeal being given, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the
matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981).
The Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction
over an appeal which is not timely brought before it; and an untimely appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v.
Riverion City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).
Mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk of the
court does not constitute a "filing" of the notice
of appeal under this rule. Isaacson v. Don us,
669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Final order or judgment.
An oralfindingof contempt of court and sentence of 15 days in the county jail, with 10 days
suspended, was not a final judgment from
which an appeal could have been taken.
Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53
(1971).
In the case of a divorce decree which did not,
by its terms, become a final judgment until
three months after it was entered, appeal had
nonetheless to be taken within one month of
the decree, which was the last proceeding necessary before the judgment became final.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah
1976).
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant. Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah
1979).
Orderfindingperson in contempt was an appealable order. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d
543 (Utah 1981).
District court orders requiring party to con-

vey property in accordance with divorce decree
were final orders and thus appealable where
the effect of such orders was to determine substantial rights in the property and to terminate
finally the litigation surrounding it. Cahoon v.
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982).
Judgment nunc pro tunc.
A judgment nunc pro tunc has no effect on
the time for appeal from that judgment and
cannot be used to reduce the time, or defeat the
right, to take an appeal. Utah State Bldg. Bd.
v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399
P.2d 141 (1965).
Where judgment was entered on April 2 but
the judgment recited that it was entered nunc
pro tunc as of Februaary 24, this latter recital
had no effect upon the time for appeal and appeal could be taken by filing notice within the
required time from April 2. Utah State Bldg.
Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249,
399 P.2d 141 (1965).
Motion to strike.
Order granting plaintiffs motion to strike
defendant's pleadings is not a final order or
judgment, and is not appealable. Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974).
Where defendant petitioned court for modification of a divorce decree and alternatively
alledged in the petition that the decree should
be vacated and set aside, the granting of defendant's motion for modification fully satisfied
his claim and his alternative claim became
moot, so that the court's granting of a motion
to strike the motion to vacate and set aside was
meaningless and no appeal would lie therefrom
Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
New trial.
An order granting a new trial is not a final
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and
places the parties in the same position as if
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v.
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964).
Order denying a motion for a new trial was
not appealable. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17
Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966).
Partial judgment
Where the real issue before the court was
whether mountain ground belonged to decedent's estate or to his widow and the decree
decided the issue against the widow, the fact
that the court retained, jurisdiction to abjudicate further matters did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to who owned the
property, and the decree entered was final and
appealable and became conclusive in the absence of a timely appeal. In re Voorhees* Estate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961).
Where plaintiffs complaint contained eight
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction
and judgement as to other causes was not a
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final judgment from which an appel could be
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965).
Where court granted one defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default
judgment in favor of that defendant on his
counterclaim, but action against other defendants and one defendant's counterclaim remained alive, court's order was not final and
an appeal from it would be dismissed. Kennedy
v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah
1979).
A judgment which disposes of fewer than all
of the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs
complaint is not a final judgment from which
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
A partial summary judgment is not generally a final judgment and hence it is not appealable under the limitations prescribed by
this rule. South Shores Concession, Inc. v.
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979).
District court order setting aside certain provisions in a default decree of divorce and providing for a further hearing on the matter was
not a final ruling from which an appeal could
be taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103
(Utah 1982).

taken from a specific judgment in a particular
case. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964).
Review in equity cases.
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme
Court may weigh the facts as well as review
the law, but will reverse on the facts only when
the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v.
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981).
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give
due deference to the trial court's decision and
reverse only when the evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's findings.
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981).
Summary judgment
Order setting aside summary judgment was
not final judgment from which aggrieved person might appeal as matter of right Jensen v.
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968).
Order denying a motion for summary judgment was not a final order and was not appealable. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc.,
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
A summary judgment in favor of one defendant alone does not constitute a final order of
judgment where the action against the remainPostjudgment orders.
ing defendant remains alive. Neider v. State
An order vacating a judgment is not a final Dep't of Transp., 665 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1983).
orderfromwhich an appeal can be taken pursuant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, Unsigned minute entry.
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute
597 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979).
The final judgment rule does not preclude an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgreview of postjudgment orders; such orders ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Manwere independently subject to the test of final- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State
ity, according to their own substance and ef- Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
fect. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1986); Sather v. Groaa, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
1982).
(Utah 1986).
Purpose of notice.
An unsigned minute entry does not constiThe object of a notice of appeal is to advise tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State
the opposite party that an appeal has been v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A.L.R.4th 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
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shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Kules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
? ?™* ° f t h e t r i a l C 0 U r t d i s P° s i n g o f t h e motion as provided above
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
b e t r e a t e d a s f l l e d a f l e r su
/^"A J ^ 1
<* entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
lpon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
described by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
o the other parties m accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court
Jo extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
ate of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies notice of appeal had to be filed within the re*
where a notice of appeal has not been timely quired time from the date of the entry that
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982).
P.2d 843 (1970).
The time for appeal of an order confirming
A party could not extend the time for filing
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon- an arbitrator's award runs from the order
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo- denying appellant's timely motion to alter or
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. amend that judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
When the question of "excusable neglect" (Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court may not consider an aparises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con- peal from the dismissal of a complaint for
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not unpaid overtime compensation until the trial
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law- court has had an opportunity to review the oryer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa- der in question by ruling on all pending posttions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc.,
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984).
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition
Filing of notice.
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court.
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). P.2d 425 (Utah 1986).
Filing with county clerk.
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely listed in this rule suspends the finality of the
filing with the juvenile court, where there was judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to
no indication when the clerk transmitted a disposition of such a motion by entry of a
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiccourt, and the original was returned to appel- tion on an appellant court. Anderson v.
lant's counsel. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
1988).
Final order or judgment.
Premature notice.
Where the trial court signed two different
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a
judgments but neither party served his pre- motion to alter or amend a judgment has been
pared judgment on the other party before sub- announced, but before the entry of an order
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg- disposing of the motion, is premature and does
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson
from either is premature because the judg- v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App.
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 1988).
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine- Reconsideration of order.
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider
ment in a youth facility for observation and
assessment prior to a final disposition was not and overrule its prior denial of the state's request
to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it
did not finally dispose of all issues, including ex rel. C.Y. v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct.
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's App. 1988).
rights as parental custodian. In re T.D.C., 748 Timeliness of notice.
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
Notice of appeal filed within the required pe1278 (Utah 1988).
riod from date of entry of order of contempt was
An unsigned minute entry is not a final filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdicjudgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, tion to hear appeal concerning the contempt
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah
to run on the date when the trial court enters 1982).
its first signed order denying the motion.
An untimely motion for a new trial had no
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah effect on the running of the time for filing a
1990).
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d
1320 (Utah 1982).
Post-judgment motions.
Case was temporarily remanded to the juveWhere a post-judgment motion was timely
nile
court in order to allow that court to make
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the
a
determination whether an order extending
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judgment werefiledafter the motion was made, but the time for appeal should be entered by the
before the disposition of the motion, the motion juvenile court under this rule, when it was not
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and apparent whether the notice of appeal was ei-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

torney fees.
oss-appeal.
tension of time to appeal.
ling of notice.
ing with county clerk.
lal order or judgment.
it-judgment motions.
imature notice.
amsideration of order.
neliness of notice.
>ate of notice.
orney fees.
to cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
ely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-

fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Cross-appeal.
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4).
Extension of time to appeal.
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the
court power to extend a time limit where a failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., authorizing the court to relievefromfinaljudgment
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ther timely filed or deemed timely filed by the
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict,
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an
extension of time in which to file a notice of
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed,
irrespective of whether the order granting additional time for filing had a nunc pro tunc
p£ i m^Qam
* " * V* S ^ g 1 ' ?
R2
N o u U X i X i a < ^ d in the prison mail by
an incarcerated criminal defendant within the

30-day period set forth in this rule was not
timely, where the notice was filed in the district court more than 30 days after entry of the
judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer, 777
p 2 a 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Date of notice.
i n determining whether a notice of appeal is
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an
a p p e i i a t e court, the appellate court is bound by
thefilingdateonthenoticeofappealtransmit«
* * * * « « * «*•*££reMS"™
R 2 d 1287
^ t a h Ct. App. 1989).
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(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
interests ofjustice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for
appeals from final judgments.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of appeal be retroactively validated in federal civil
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199.

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal* An appeal from an interlocutory
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied,
the filing fee shall be refunded.
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain.
(1)A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the controlling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed;
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon;
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal
should be permitted; and
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of
law and opinion.
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
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Challenge to sufficiency of evidence.
Determination regarding substantial rights.
Irreparable damage.
New trial motion.
—Arbitrary exercise of authority.
Order vacating summary judgment.
Purpose in granting.
When to grant
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following
annotations are taken from cases decided under former Rule 5, R. Utah S. Ct.
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence.
Intermediate appeal, and not writ of habeas
corpus, was only proper means to challenge
sufficiency of evidence to support issuance of
indictment and trial court's denial of defendant's request for discovery of testimony of witnesses before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake
County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976).
Determination
regarding
substantial
rights.
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered
when her son's car, in which she was riding,
collided with a cow which had fallen on highway from defendant's truck, preliminary order
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the
truck was negligence as a matter of law and
that the trial should be held only on the issue
of damages involved substantial rights of the
parties and would materially affect the final
decision and, therefore, was subject to an intermediate appeal. Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d
65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965).
Irreparable damage.
Temporary order allocating water usage by
plaintiff pending further study by court raised
sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending
the filing of the final order fixing and decreeing the water rights of the respective parties as
to be appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah
2d 77, 348 P.2d 679 (1960).

New trial motion.
—Arbitrary exercise of authority.
If a trial court's authority with respect to a
motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily,
the proper redress is either in a petition for
interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in
a proper case, or in the preservation of error for
review, if necessary, upon the final outcome of
the case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185,
389 P.2d 736 (1964).
Order vacating summary judgment.
A party does not have an appeal as a matter
of right from an order vacating a summary
judgment but may seek an appeal pursuant to
this rule. Jensen v. Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23,447
P.2d 906 (1968).
Purpose in granting.
The purpose to be served in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible, consistent with thoroughness and efficiency in the
administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11
Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).
When to g r a n t
The desired objective of efficiency in procedure can be promoted, and an interlocutory appeal is properly granted, if it appears essential
to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in
advance as a necessary foundation upon which
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high likelihood that the litigation can be finally disposed of on such an appeal. Manwill v. Oyler,
11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).
Whenever it appears likely that the matters
in dispute can be finally disposed of upon a
trial, or where they may become moot, or
where they can, without involving any serious
difficulty, abide determination in the event of
an appeal after the trial, the desired objective
of efficient administration of justice is best
served by refusing to entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting the case proceed to
trial. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361
P.2d 177 (1961).
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